The Roundtable
Forum
Official
Newsletter of the Battle of Midway
Roundtable
20 June 2011
Issue
Number: 2011-15
Our 14th Year
~
AROUND THE TABLE ~
MEMBERS’
TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Hypo Photos in Naval Aviation News
2. 69th Anniversary at NIOC
3. Remembering Frank “DeLo” DeLorenzo
4. Carrier Combat Experience
5. Re-evaluating Midway (1976 movie)
6, BOM Veteran Statistics
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1. HYPO PHOTOS IN NAVAL AVIATION NEWS ( see issues #12 and 13 )
Ed.
note: in the following
message, Admiral Showers is referring to two photos that purport to show
working spaces in the “dungeon” of Station Hypo at Pearl Harbor. To see them, click this link, click
“Photos” in the menu on the left, then click “Codebreakers” in the middle of
the page. The photos in question are
labeled “View in the Dungeon” and “USS California Bandsmen.” (You need to be registered on the site to
get access. If you are not,
registration is free.)
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27 May 2011
From: RADM D. M. “Mac” Showers, USN-Ret
Virginia
BOM vet, intel analyst,
Combat Intelligence Unit (“Hypo”), Pearl Harbor
Both of these photos are of the "machine room" in the
"new" FRUPAC building we occupied in September 1943. According
to the Cryptologic Museum Librarian, these photos were taken in July 1945 and
were declassified in December 1945.
Note the high ceiling in the room. That was the way the room was
configured in the new building, but the ceiling would have been only normal
height in the "dungeon." No, I don't believe we can attribute
any of the California bandsmen of 1941-42 to still be in the machine room in
July 1945.
I left FRUPAC in early January 1945 to go to Guam with the CINCPAC
Staff. CAPT John Harper had relieved CAPT Bill Goggins as OinC FRUPAC,
and he accomplished many upgrades in the arrangements, office facilities and
equipment, which these and many other photos in the group show. (I think
that must have been the purpose of the pictures.) All the time I was
there, NO CAMERAS were allowed anywhere inside.
The machine room equipment all during the war consisted of IBM
punch-card machines, card sorters, and high speed printers. This was
where every new intercepted Japanese message began processing. A card was
punched for each five-digit code group, and these were all sorted and filed in
"numerical" order. Then the message was printed on wide paper
with a single code group on each line double-spaced down the left side, as
the groups appeared in the message. These were the "worksheets"
for the linguists to commence translations of the messages. When a
verified meaning of a code group was known, the Japanese and English meaning
were also printed on the line with the code group. So far as I know, all of these worksheets from the war were
destroyed.
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2. 69th ANNIVERSARY AT NIOC
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3 June 2011
From: RADM D. M. “Mac” Showers, USN-Ret
Virginia
BOM vet, intel analyst,
Combat Intelligence Unit (“Hypo”), Pearl Harbor
I'll continue to call it NSA because that's the total organization and
it's all located on the Ft. Meade base, but it turned out that my participation
was for an all-Navy audience that represented the new Navy Information
Operations Command Maryland. Assuming you're familiar with the Navy
Security Group, this is their new name in their role as part of the National
Cyber Command of which General Alexander, Director of NSA, is also Commander of
the National Cyber Command. They have "Maryland" in their name
because they constitute the Navy contingent at NSA (in Maryland).
You wouldn't believe how many people are involved in this total organization
and how large is has suddenly become to conduct "cyber warfare."
The observance was held in the base theater at Ft. Meade because they needed to accommodate 300 or so sailors and officers. The theater appeared to be full. It was a "formal" program with the command master chief as Master of Ceremonies. They paraded the colors, a 10-person chorus of sailors in the command sang the National Anthem, a chaplain gave the invocation, and then two sailors gave a "Huntley-Brinkley" recitation to set the stage of the BOM. Next, the C.O. of the command, CAPT Steven J. Ashworth, introduced me. Since these were NSA troops engaged in the modern versions of NSA work, I couched my remarks in a description of the HYPO attack on JN-25, the primitive methods and equipment we worked with, and how we kept Admiral Nimitz informed, held the nay-sayers in Washington at bay, and basically enabled ADM Nimitz and the USN to be participants in the battle. I only talked about 20 minutes. Then they had another "Huntley-Brinkley" presentation describing the conduct of the battle with the results achieved. Then a chaplain's benediction, and the departure of the official party. The whole program was just under one hour, extremely well done, and with very prolonged standing applause from the audience at the end. (I felt like they wanted me to do an encore.)
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3. REMEMBERING FRANK “DELO” DELORENZO ( see issue #14 )
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12 June 2011
From: Allen M. Peisner
Michigan
I had the pleasure of meeting Delo on May 18, 2002. He was kind
enough to meet me and three Vietnam War vets in his house on that day.
We were about an hour late for the meeting. He was most gracious about
this and did not complain or cut short our visit. We all had questions
about him flying the Coronado and his life since then. He showed us a
model of the four engine seaplane and also the painting John Greaves made
of it flying over Pearl Harbor with Nimitz shortly before landing on the oil
coated waters.
Since that time, I kept in touch with Delo by email and phone. He was
always very prompt to answer the emails and I enjoyed talking to him on the
phone many times. He always was more than kind to answer my questions
about his wartime flights.
I will always remember Delo as being forever cheerful no matter how bad his
personal circumstances, including having to struggle after his home was
destroyed by a hurricane. He was always more than kind to answer my
endless questions about how he flew those long distances without the modern
electronics we now have.
It is with deep regret that I learned of his passing. My condolences to
all who had the pleasure of knowing him.
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14 June 2011
From: John Greaves
Canada
I was sent a link to a news website that has a short clip about DeLo
and the PB2Y. Hope it stays up for
awhile
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Ed. note: click
here to read the article and view the video. It’s a poignant story about DeLo’s
involvement in the restoration of a PB2Y at the National Naval Aviation Museum
in Pensacola.
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4 . CARRIER COMBAT EXPERIENCE
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28 May 2011
From: Ted Kraver
Arizona
Last week I had the pleasure of attending the annual BOM
celebration hosted by the Arizona Chapter of the Naval Order of the
U.S. George Mitchell, a retired
attorney and amateur historian gave a quite accurate 1.5 hour
presentation. He used a map of the
Pacific and made heavy reference to Shattered Sword by Jonathan Parshall
and Anthony Tully. He told the oft-told
tale with unusual depth.
I volunteered make the 2012
presentation, but will depart from a focus on the too-familiar story for this
group, I will be weaving a set of people in unique situation stories from our No
Right to Win book to try for an all human chain of events. I have many models, pictures, paintings and
other artifacts to add color to the presentations.
But I have one question that I
do not believe we have discussed:
Has anyone considered the fact
that the U.S. had the only carrier-to-carrier combat experienced admiral
commanding its forces, and with Captain Elliott Buckmaster in command of the Yorktown?
[ Ed. note: Ted’s point here is that among all of
the admirals and carrier commanding officers on both sides in the BOM, only
Fletcher and Buckmaster had experience in CV vs. CV combat. ]
I contend that going from no
experience to even one battle is huge in such a complex environment as a
carrier-to-carrier war. A prime example
is the botched-up initial launch from the Hornet by the novice Marc
Mitscher, followed by future success.
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5. RE-EVALUATING MIDWAY (1976 MOVIE)
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1 June 2011
From: Scott Kair
Illinois
Last year’s suggestion to watch the Memorial Day showing of the 1976
movie Midway with an eye towards what it got right was worth
repeating. American Movie Classics
channel ran it again as part of their Memorial Day observance. This year the showing was promoted as
commemorating the 35th anniversary of the film’s release, and the film was
described as a classic.
The portrayals of the respective roles of Admirals Yamamoto and Nagumo
in planning and executing the Midway operation quickly jumped out this
time. In the film version, it was clear
that Yamamoto’s plan wasn’t unanimously approved. Arguments against it were blunt and sufficient to generate
further meetings until consensus could be reached. The film made it clear that there were reservations about the
plan.
The communications failure over the cancellation of the reconnaissance
flights over Pearl Harbor was also emphasized.
Yamamoto received the radio message, therefore it was assumed that
Nagumo did too. Nagumo is later shown
asking what the reconnaissance reports showed, and then why there were no
reports. The film also made it clear
that when Nagumo made his turn towards the northeast, he did so in order to
close on what he believed at the time to be a single American carrier. It was not until the attack of the third
carrier-borne torpedo squadron that his air staff points out to him that Kido
Butai is obviously confronting more than one American carrier. By then, it is too late.
Further insight is provided by contrasting scenes involving planning
decisions. Yamamoto is shown having a
fairly large staff meeting to discuss his plan for the Midway operation. When no consensus could be met, the meeting
is adjourned and further meetings scheduled.
Slightly later in the movie, after Adm. Halsey recommends that Adm.
Spruance replace him for the battle, Spruance is shown visiting Halsey in his
hospital room to seek Halsey’s counsel.
Halsey repeats an adage: “When you’re in command, command.”
Whether the scene happened or not, we are fortunate that Spruance took
the advice.
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6. BOM VETERAN STATISTICS ( see issue #13 )
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28 May 2011
From: CAPT Lawrence B. Brennan, USN-Ret
New Jersey
Tragically, your estimate of
8,000 living veterans of the BOM strikes me as overly optimistic. Your estimate of combat deaths is probably
close. Perhaps a little low figuring a
higher mortality rate among naval aviators. Three CVs probably had 400 to 450
men in flying status each. Thus we had about 1,200 to 1,350 tailhook aviators
and crew. Probably another 250+ shore
side men in flight status. They probably had a 25% loss rate by the end of
the war.
Age, of course, is the ultimate factor. I question if one third of the WW II
warriors remain alive nearly 70 years after the battle. My assumptions are:
• The youngest officers were born in
1919/1920 . Ensign Gay was born in 1917 and that may be a more
representative year.
• The youngest enlisted men were born
in 1923/1924.
• The ships involved primarily were
manned by older sailors of the peacetime fleet. The great influx of the massive numbers of volunteers did not
reach the fleet by June 1942 and most didn't get to older ships in the Pacific
in the first seven months. The fleet was manned by veterans who had homesteaded
for lengthy periods.
• Many of the sailors were veterans who
had enlisted during the 12+ years since the beginning of the Depression. The
usual pattern of "one enlistment and leave" was altered by the
financial realities of the Depression.
• Health issues also may have impacted
the life expectancy of many sailors. There was a sharp drop in the standard of
living and diet during the Depression, and medical care was not widely
available for all. Also, most sailors were exposed to health hazards on board
ship. Many officers and men smoked and
were exposed to asbestos.
• The transfers of experienced officers
and men to form nucleus crews for new construction did not yet have great
impact on manning of these ships. Thus the crews tended to be older than
expected. There probably were more enlisted men born before 1910-1915 than we
would expect. A fair number of chiefs and petty officers were born between 1900
and 1910. It is improbable that a
significant number of these veterans remain alive.
• In addition to combat losses there were large numbers of non-combat
fatalities during World War II.
• Most BOM veterans today would be at least 85-87. The percentage of survivors probably is
low.
• A December 2010 Pearl Harbor article stated that [there is about
a] 5% to 10% survival rate [at] present.
Bottom line, my estimate is that fewer than 3,000 BOM veterans remain
alive. Using the Pearl Harbor estimate
of 5% to 10% survival rate to now, we probably have 1,500 to 3,000 surviving
veterans of the Battle of Midway.
Sadly, the World War II generation is reduced to a small percentage of the
large number of men who served in the greatest conflict.
Thanks to my good friends CAPT
Pete Leenhouts, USN Ret. and CDR Sean P. Walsh, USN Ret. for their sage
suggestions and improvements on my initial version of this note. Also, thanks to you for the valuable work
you are doing keeping the flame alive to study this decisive battle and the men
who fought to save America.
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~ NOW
HEAR THIS! ~
NEWS
& INFO IN THIS ISSUE:
- Book Review: Attack on Pearl Harbor
- Featured Link
- Editor’s Notes
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BOOK REVIEW: ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR: STRATEGY, COMBAT,
MYTHS, DECEPTIONS
by Alan D. Zimm (2011)
When I first became aware that a major new book about the Pearl Harbor
attack was in the works, my immediate thought was Pearl Harbor? In
2011? What could possibly be said about
Pearl Harbor that wasn’t said long ago by Morison, Prange, Toland, Lord, and Fuchida?
Surprisingly, the answer is quite a lot. While those earlier works rather thoroughly
cover the details of the raid, none of them deal in great depth with Japanese
strategy—what the enemy intended to do at Pearl Harbor, how they intended to do
it, why they planned to do it the way they did, and most especially, how their
entire strategy was inherently flawed.
That’s the approach taken by Roundtable member CDR Alan Zimm,
USN-Retired, who is an operational research analyst at Johns Hopkins University. His new book is far from a simple rerun of
the familiar tale—instead, he has probed very deeply into Japanese planning,
preparation, and execution of the attack, with particular focus on factors that
he believes other historians have either skipped or gotten wrong.
Dr. Zimm’s
forte is operational analysis, and that’s the thrust of his book, focusing
entirely on what the Japanese intended to do vs. what they actually did, plus
intriguing postulations about what would have transpired had they done certain
things differently, like mounting a third strike against Pearl Harbor's fuel
tank farm, or launching the attack a week earlier when Hawaii's defenses were
locked and loaded.
The book includes several revelations that will be new to many readers,
and one in particular is essential to the author’s thesis: Admiral Yamamoto’s
fundamental goal for attacking Pearl Harbor.
Because of his renown as a champion of naval air power, there is a
general belief that he first hoped to sink the Pacific Fleet’s carriers, and
failing that, its battleships. The fact
is, though, that the primary target of Kido Butai’s raiders was actually
battleships, not carriers.
That’s not news to those familiar with the subject—Samuel Eliot Morison
said as much in Volume III of his landmark history of the U.S. Navy in WW2,
published in 1948.
However, Dr. Zimm reveals that authors who have tabbed the American
battleships as Yamamoto’s primary target haven’t quite seen the whole
picture. Yamamoto thought he knew the
American people well from his time in the U.S. before the war, which led him to
believe that the public had a special fondness for the Navy’s battleships,
viewing them as romantic icons of the nation’s prestige and worldly
influence. He thought that smashing
them into scrap in one violent stroke would be so appalling to Americans that
they would be cowed to the negotiating table rather than driven for revenge at
any cost. For Yamamoto knew that the
only way Japan could win against America was by negotiating from a position of
military dominance.
Consequently,
Admiral Yamamoto’s primary target at Pearl Harbor was neither carriers nor
battleships, but the American people themselves.
Beyond
that, the book abounds in revelations of how faulty the Japanese plan was, in its
conception, rehearsing, and execution.
The initial attack was badly fumbled by the flight leader, Mitsuo
Fuchida, who botched a prearranged tactical signal built around the firing of
flares as the formation approached Pearl Harbor—one flare if surprise was
achieved, two if it was not, which would require all aircraft to abandon attack
priorities and immediately strike en masse.
Surprise was indeed achieved and Fuchida launched a flare, but noticed
that the Zeros were not pealing off to their assigned targets. Thinking they’d missed the first flare, he
fired another one, momentarily forgetting that one plus one equals two. The dive bomber pilots saw both flares and
attacked per the “no surprise” contingency, creating chaos for the torpedo
planes that led to four of them being shot down. As the author put it, they “went into the attack with the same
level of organization as the Kentucky Derby after the horses are turned loose.”
To add to that fiasco, a substantial portion of the strike was wasted
in attacks on empty carrier anchorages, sending bombs and torpedoes toward
targets of little importance. In the
end, only 11 of 40 torpedoes hit what Yamamoto sent them for, and only one bomb
did any significant damage to the American fleet by sinking the Arizona. The sole element of the raid that exceeded
Japanese expectations was the attack upon Army aircraft at Hickam Field, and
that only happened because of unwitting American cooperation—the Army was
defending against sabotage, not an air raid.
Dr. Zimm’s analysis includes a few notable what-if scenarios,
including popular speculations about the enemy’s failure to strike Pearl
Harbor’s fuel tanks and shipyard facilities.
A detailed examination of the structure and containment features of the
tank farm, matched against the limited aircraft and ordnance that the enemy
could muster for a third strike against alert defenses reveals that fears about
the Pacific Fleet being forced back to California due to fuel exhaustion are
exaggerated. Even with several tanks
ruptured, their design tended to mitigate the chance for fire, and the quantity
of lost fuel compared to that on board the fleet’s ships (including tankers)
was quite adequate to keep the fleet where it was. Operations toward the central Pacific would not have been
possible, but that wasn’t going to happen soon in any case. Similarly, concerns about damage to the
naval shipyard ignores the scope of the target compared to what the Japanese
could have brought against it through an AA and fighter gauntlet that would
have been far worse than they’d faced earlier.
My criticisms of the book are few and minor: Dr. Zimm likes to use Latin and French terms to emphasize a
point, and that sent me to Google a few times to figure out what the point was. Then, I found that a bookmark in the
glossary was necessary due to his frequent use of Japanese words. Finally, I wished that the key map of Pearl
Harbor on December 7th that introduces the first chapter had been printed as a
two-page spread instead of just a half page, since frequent referral to the
fine details on that map greatly aid the reader in understanding numerous
points in the text. Unless you have a
teenagers’s eyes, you may want to keep a magnifying glass handy.
Beyond that, this is a five-star addition to your Pacific War
library. I can highly recommend it to
all who have ever read one of the more familiar treatises on the “Day of
Infamy.”
Here’s the Amazon
link, and as always, linking to a commercial web site is meant only as a
convenience for our members, not an endorsement of the company nor the site
over its competitors. —RR
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FEATURED LINK
Here is a pair of interesting videos on USS Enterprise (CV-6),
with thanks to Ron Nunez. The first one
shows the ship under attack in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. You may have seen some of this footage before,
but this version has some helpful text added in key spots.
The second one is a newsreel story about CV-6 being sent to
the scrap yard in 1958.
Click
here for the featured link.
(Eastern Solomons)
Click
here for 2nd video. (To the scrap
yard.)
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EDITOR’S NOTES
~ I’ve added a significant new feature to the Midway Veterans Roster on
our web site. In the “Remembrance”
section, which honors our BOM veteran members who have made their final muster,
I’ve added a link alongside each name to the newsletter issue or other reference
that honors the vet on the occasion of his passing. Constructing this feature was a very interesting and poignant
exercise, for it required me to re-read all of those obituaries. I’m thankful that the Roundtable is able to
help preserve the memory of those fine men in this modest manner. (Thanks to Johan Lupander in Sweden for the
suggestion.)
~ You’ll notice that in the above list, there
are no “obit” links for ALVIN SOBEL (VS-5 gunner) and WILL SPRINGER (Enterprise
aviation mechanic). That’s because
they passed away in the earliest days of the Roundtable, and I could find no
obituary or biography information on them in the archives. If anyone can supply such info, official or
informal, I’ll be happy to post and link it.
I’d like to have 100% on those obit links if possible.
~ Here’s news of another new book by a
Roundtable author, Refighting the Pacific War, edited by James
Bresnahan. It’s a digest of
contributions by numerous historians (several on the Roundtable), focused on various
“what if” scenarios on all aspects of the Pacific War. It’s not alternative history in the normal
sense, but an in-depth analysis of what didn’t happen because of what did. It’s due out in October. For a preview, click here.
~ Click here for
a report on the 69th BOM anniversary observance at Pearl Harbor. (Thanks Mac Showers.)