The Roundtable
Forum
Official
Newsletter of the Battle of Midway
Roundtable
25 April 2011
Issue
Number: 2011-10
Our 14th Year
~
AROUND THE TABLE ~
MEMBERS’
TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Why Didn’t Nagumo “Get It?”
2. Midway: Japan’s “Bridge Too Far?”
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1. WHY DIDN’T NAGUMO “GET IT?” ( see issue #09 )
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18 April 2011
From: Lu Yu
Iowa
First of all, I agree that
"blunders" (perhaps better call them mistakes) at BOM are mostly
in hindsight. Despite their early
successes, BOM was the first carrier battle for Nagumo and his staff. This is a new type of warfare. No one at that time knew how it should
be fought. Many concepts and
ideas of carrier battle were just forming up on operational, doctrinal, tactical
and technological level. The U.S.
forces also made mistakes and also had many shortcomings. (Many of these are well discussed
in Lundstrom's Black Shoe Carrier Admiral). Fortunately (for U.S.), it turns out that IJN's mistakes and
weaknesses had more effect and led to far worse consequences, partly
because of U.S. intelligence advantage and Japanese problems in strategic
planning, and partly by luck.
That being said, Nagumo's choice [was] not very sound, even if we consider his
situation at that time, for the following reasons.
(1) It is true that Tone #4 plane only reported "what
appears to be a carrier."
But Nagumo and his staff should have suspected more
carriers. Notice that the Japanese
had never spotted U.S. carriers operating singly before BOM. At Coral Sea, two U.S. carriers were
operating close to each other when they were attacked. For the Doolittle Raid, Nittō Maru
actually reported three carriers before being sunk. In Nagumo Report, the estimation of U.S.
carrier strength is 2 to 3 (fleet) carriers and 2 to 3 "special"
(meaning converted) carriers. It is not
very likely that U.S. would have used only one carrier against an invasion of
Midway.
(2) The turn at 0917 has the
effect of increasing the distance from Midway.
However this didn't make much sense at that time. In Nagumo Report, it is estimated that
Midway has "2 squadrons of patrol flying boats, 1 squadron of
Army bombers and 1 squadron of fighters" and this estimation "can be
doubled in an emergency." Based on
these figures, almost all these forces (even in the doubled-up version) had
attacked by 0900 and many (perhaps most of, in Nagumo's eyes) planes had
been shot down. Not a single hit was
scored. Thus, Midway was no longer a
big threat to Kidō Butai, even though its airfield was still
functioning.
(3) The turn at 0917 decreases the
distance from U.S. carrier's reported position. Kidō Butai was on the defensive side at this
time of the battle. They were nowhere
near launching strike forces and were about 200 nm away from Tone #4
plane's reported position. As I
mentioned in the last newsletter issue, Nagumo failed to use his
technological advantages as a defensive tool (see note below), i.e.
to keep Kidō Butai at a safe distance while he
was still preparing for a strike. In
short, the turn at 0917 is an unnecessary risk. It has not much to gain and exposes Kidō Butai under
greater danger.
In my humble opinion, Nagumo's choice of course might have been based
on three considerations. First, Nagumo
and his staff underestimated the combat performance of U.S. forces,
largely based on attacks made prior to 0900. These Midway-based forces had many inexperienced aviators, some
flew obsolete planes and there was no fighter escort. They did not know
the real power of U.S. carrier-based forces, especially the dive
bombers. Second, they did not realize the various weaknesses in their
defense, especially the CAP system.
Third, they failed to fully consider the disastrous consequences of
being hit with strike planes [with] fuel and ordnance in the hangar. The last two have been well discussed
in Shattered Sword.
All of the above three considerations are clearly wrong in retrospect, but
not so clearly in the heat of the battle.
Note: Besides the advantage in
aircraft's range, IJN also has better guidance for strike forces. Their scout floatplanes and some
kanko/kanbaku planes were equipped with "long-wavelength guidance"
transmitters and receivers. This was
how Chikuma #5 plane and Kobayashi's force found the U.S. fleet with
relative ease, even though Tone #4 plane's reported position was way
off. Some of these uses were recorded
in Nagumo Report. This advantage means
Nagumo's strike planes have a good chance to find U.S. forces and do
not need to spend extra fuel looking around for them, provided
that there is an available scout plane shadowing near U.S. TF. Making good contact and guidance is one
notable better performance of IJN than U.S. forces.
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Ed.
note: Lu is from China and is a student at the
University of Iowa.
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2. MIDWAY: JAPAN’S “BRIDGE TOO FAR?” ( see issue #09 )
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21 April 2011
From: Ronald Martell
Florida
Chuck
Wohlrab’s cogent post in the 2011-09 issue of the Forum criticizing
Japan’s plan to invade Midway presents a well-reasoned
argument from the Western perspective; but not from the Japanese point
of view. Admiral Yamamoto knew Japan
could never defeat the United States.
Japan’s only hope lay in a negotiated peace allowing Japan to keep its
territorial gains and resume purchasing oil and scrap iron from America.
In November 1941 Japan had laid out its Second Stage strategy, either
to sever the American-Australian lines of communications by attacking and
invading New Guinea, New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa or to invade Midway and the
Aleutians. While others may argue Japan
should have adopted a completely different strategy, the Japanese Navy
ultimately focused on only those two alternatives. The IJN Staff favored the former, while Yamamoto insisted upon an
invasion of Midway to draw out the American fleet and destroy it before America
gained naval supremacy.
Those authors who criticize the Japanese attack on Midway never argue
how the alternative plan could possibly have favored Japan. An attack on Midway would draw the Americans
to a known location during a reasonably fixed time frame. The alternative line of attack would also
draw the American fleet like iron filings to a magnet but without any guarantee
as to when or where.
Some Japanese viewed the Midway invasion as a prelude to attacks on
Johnston and Palmyra Islands and then Oahu, hopefully forcing America into a
negotiated peace. After the Doolittle
Raid exposed Japan’s vulnerability to attack across the Central Pacific,
thereby threatening the Emperor’s safety, the Midway operation would have taken
place without regard to any difficulties.
Certainly events showed Japan could not have supplied Midway. Japan could not supply Guadalcanal either,
but that did not stop them from sending 23,000 troops there. Supplying troops on New Guinea, New
Caledonia and Fiji would have been impossible; nonetheless that was the attack
of choice for the Japanese Naval General Staff.
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Ed. note: Ron is the son-in-law of Yorktown veteran
TM3/c Ed Adkins.
~ NOW
HEAR THIS! ~
NEWS
& INFO IN THIS ISSUE:
- All Back Issues Now On Line
- Featured Link
- Editor’s Notes
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ALL BACK ISSUES NOW ON
LINE
I’m pleased to announce
our second significant upgrade to the web site this month, and this is the one
that many of you have wanted for quite a long time. In fact, this has been one of our members’ most frequent
requests: convenient access to all past issues of The Roundtable Forum newsletter,
and in a manner that allows for easy searching.
In the past, I’ve tried
to satisfy that need by providing CDs or Zip files to everyone who asked, but
those methods didn’t reach everyone, they didn’t facilitate searching, and they
were obsolete as soon as a new issue was posted. All of that is now resolved:
all issues, from the newsletter’s inception in May 2004, are posted
on-line. As a bonus, I’ve also
converted all of them to a consistent format, with the same font and background
color you’re accustomed to seeing (like you’re seeing now). The end result is a newsletter archive
that’s easy to search, and with pages that are very easy to read.
To find any back issue,
go to the “Back Issues” link under “Newsletter” on our home page, or click here for an advance
look.
To help you search the
newsletter archives or even the entire web site, I’ve posted another new file
with specific search hints using common search engines like Google. You can find it on our home page under
“References,” or check it out now: click
here.
Note that on-line
search engines may not be able to find a page that was very recently posted for
the first time, or which was moved to a different location on the web
site. If a link doesn’t show up that
obviously should be there, give it time.
In a related move, that
earlier search tool announced on a trial basis in issue 7 has been
taken down after a month of testing. It
worked rather well, but certain technical factors made it unsuitable for
permanent use. However, that system was
the inspiration for the new method announced above, and for that reason
Roundtable member John Rasor, its developer, deserves our sincere thanks and
praise. It’s the active participation
of members like John that help make the Roundtable the success that it is.
For the future, I will
be working to add the Roundtable’s pre-newsletter archives (the e-mail circular
initiated by Bill Price in the 1990s) to the web site. That will be a lengthy process, but I’ll
keep you updated as I go along.
Comments and questions
regarding the new on-line newsletter files are welcome. —RR
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FEATURED LINK
Here’s an interesting You-Tube video of interviews with
four BOM B-26 aircrewmen: pilots James
Collins and James Muri, Muri’s copilot Prem Moore, and Collins’ navigator
Thomas Weems. It runs about 10 minutes,
and provides interesting details, both familiar and less-known, about their
fateful flight on the morning of 4 June ’42.
(With thanks to Pat Doyle.)
Click
here for the featured link..
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EDITOR’S NOTES
~ In connection with the new on-line
newsletters described above, I’ve revised the Index page to include links
that will quickly take you to any issue cited in the index. That makes the index far more useful than
it’s ever been, and in fact, resolves a justified criticism that I’ve heard
more than once. Comments are welcome.
~ I’ve added another entry to the new “Book
Review” section of our web site, announced in the last issue. This one is for Donald Sanford’s novel, Midway,
the book version of the 1976 movie.
Since the film has collected such widespread criticism on the
Roundtable, does the book, which directly tracks the screenplay, deserve the
same harsh review? You might be
surprised. Click here.
~ Here’s another You-Tube video that’s not
“featured link” quality, but some will find it interesting. It’s a computer graphics rendition of the
BOM, presented without narration. Its
best quality is the stereo sound track, so turn up your speakers. The images are good, but rather cartoon-like,
and the producers weren’t very careful with regard to historical
accuracy—you’ll see Marine F4F-4s flying from Midway, USN aircraft with the
prewar markings, and Japanese CVs that look more like Essex class
carriers, complete with 5-inch/.38 turrets.
Just enjoy the audio. Click
here.