The Roundtable Forum

Official Newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable

 

21 March 2011

Issue Number:  2011-07

Our 14th Year

 

 

 

~ AROUND THE TABLE ~

 

MEMBERS’ TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE:

 

1.  From Our Archives: B-25s on the Hornet

2.  Japanese Estimates of USN Aircraft Combat Radius

 

 

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1.  FROM OUR ARCHIVES: B-25s ON THE HORNET

 

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14 April 2004

From:  CDR Clayton E. Fisher, USN-Ret

California

BOM vet, SBD pilot, VB-8, USS Hornet

 

Roy Gee and I, VB-8 pilots, were aboard the Hornet for the Doolittle Raid.  I witnessed the trial launch of a couple B-25s from the Hornet just after the Hornet returned to Norfolk from the shakedown cruise in the Gulf of Mexico at the end of January 1942.  The B-25s were flown in from Langley Field, landed at NAS Norfolk and were hoisted aboard the Hornet.

 

The Hornet was back out to sea for almost 3 days.  I spent time talking to the B-25 pilots about their launch. Those pilots seemed unconcerned about taking off from the Hornet.  My only advice to them was, on your first carrier takeoff it feels like you are going too slow to get airborne if you are looking at the flight deck.  I told them to glance out at the water and believe their airspeed indicator.  If you have a 20 knot wind [and] the ship is moving at 25 knots, that is 45 knots.  Most  aircraft only needed to be traveling on the flight deck at  35 to 40 knots, but your airspeed indicator will read about 80 to 90 knots, a safe speed for launch.

 

I watched all the B-25s being launched [in April, during the Doolittle Raid] from the Hornet's forward starboard catwalk.  I was about half way between the front of the island structure and the bow.  I think Roy Gee told me he watched the B-25s from the port side catwalk.

 

Most of the Hornet pilots had a B-25 pilot sharing their room.  I don't remember which pilot was assigned to my room.  If I remember correctly, the pilot was a member of a backup flight crew and did not get launched.  Army folding cots were used and I think most of the Navy pilots let the B-25 pilots sleep in their bunks and we slept on the cots which were sort of jammed into the small  rooms.

 

I think the B-25 pilots were more worried about getting safely off the Hornet flight deck than their mission.  I told some of them the Langley B-25s had no problems taking off.  Evidently, they had not been told about the Langley B-25s.  Seemed very strange to me at the time.

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2.  JAPANESE ESTIMATES OF USN AIRCRAFT COMBAT RADIUS   ( see issue #6 )

 

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7 March 2011

From:  Jonathan B. Parshall

Minnesota

co-author, Shattered Sword

 

Lu Yu and I have been carrying on a lively conversation regarding many questions surrounding Midway.  He can read Japanese, and he’s very well-informed.  Regarding the maps in Shattered Sword, they are an amalgam of many of the maps of the battle found in other sources, in particular the Naval War College report, the Nagumo Report, and some of the Senshi Sosho maps.  I have a vector drawing package to scan these maps in, and then lined them up using the longitude-latitude lines on each of them.  Not surprisingly, there were distortions and inconsistencies, particularly in the Nagumo Report map, if I recall correctly.

 

So far as I know, my master map of the battle is the first time that anyone has used electronic means to map the battlefield in any capacity. It proved useful, in that I could quickly calculate distances.  But it had its limitations,  because my map is only as good as the accuracy of the base maps going in, and the bottom line is that many of the positions shown on those maps are approximations.  I wouldn’t think that an error of 10-12 miles is abnormal at all, given the way these maps were probably originally created.  This was, after all, back before any sort of satellite navigation systems. The aircraft positions, in particular, are largely a matter of guesswork. Amari [Tone #4 pilot], like all the pilots in the battle, was navigating off a clipboard chart on his lap.  Likewise, the sinking positions of the ships are approximations.  One of the few very precise positions we know—that of the chunk of wreckage found from Kaga—is quite a ways away from the sinking position(s) listed for her in various sources on the battle.

 

Regarding the usage of statute miles vs. nautical miles, if it came from a U.S. naval source, it’s nautical miles.  I don’t think this would have been a source of confusion as to position—during the battle, both sides were using nautical miles as their unit of measure.

 

As for the combat radii of various aircraft, it depends on the ordnance being carried, total fuel load, the altitude being flown at, local weather conditions, whether or not I’m able to be cruising at absolutely the most efficient cruising speed, the skill of the pilot, type of fuel I’m using, etc.  During the battle, a wise commander would have erred on the side of caution regarding which numbers to use.

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5 March 2011

From:  Barrett Tillman

Arizona

author, Clash of the Carriers; Whirlwind

 

One of my recent Flight Journal articles necessarily focused on [aircraft tactical radius], and I learned that when it comes to radius the answer is, “it depends."
 
I found no air arm with a policy stating to wit: "Tactical radius shall be defined as X percent of demonstrated maximum range with a given payload."  It just doesn't exist.  It should, but it doesn't.

So what does it mean?
 
Well, it's hard to say.  The manufacturers’ brochures and the air force specs showing max range do not always jibe.  Besides that, both manufacturers and air forces have reason to fudge the numbers for obvious reasons.  But if you go to standard references and cross-check against other sources that do list a combat radius, you get approximately 30-33% which provides a reasonable fuel reserve; "reasonable" being subject to interpretation.  (If your engine quits as you taxi to the fuel pump, that may be reasonable.  If your engine quits in the pattern, that's not so reasonable.)
 
For what it's worth:
For the F4F-4 (minus drop tanks) 845 statute miles, 33% = 278 s.m.
For the TBD (with torpedo) 435 s.m., 33% = 143 s.m.

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5 March 2011

From:  CDR Scott I. Smith, USN-Ret

Washington (state)

 

In response to the query by Lu Yu, I would respond that aircraft range is not a hard number, and the Japanese had little data upon which to base American aircraft range.  The only experience upon which to base range was at the Battle of Coral Sea.  It is doubtful the Japanese had any other data besides the distances plotted at Coral Sea.

 

De-classified Navy data on the F4F-4 states that the aircraft had a maximum range of 722 nm at 140 knots, but a combat radius of only 105 nm.  The maximum range figure means the plane could fly a 360 nm radius, the 105 nm is based on fuel used to climb to altitude, using a fast-cruise speed while weaving over their charges, some combat time over the target, and maximum range speed while heading home.  It is the fast-cruise weaving and the combat portions of the flight that shortens the combat radius.  An F4F might have 20-30 minutes of combat over the target, while an SBD might have only 5-10 minutes.  However, there are still several other variables:

 

Obviously, the F4F pilots couldn’t use fast-cruise all the way to the target.  Some used a later launch time to catch up with their slower charges while flying towards to the target.  Knowing the distance they had to fly to the Japanese fleet, fighter pilots had to use every trick in their book to reduce fuel consumption while maintaining fighting speed near the Japanese Zero.  

 

On 4 June 1942, the wind was out of the northeast.  This means the Americans would be steaming away from the Japanese during each launch and recovery.  Conversely, the Japanese would be closing on the American fleet during each launch and recovery.  However, the American aircraft would have a tailwind while heading towards the Japanese fleet – getting maybe 30-40 nautical miles of free distance at altitude while loosing only 10-15 nm from the headwind returning to the carrier at low altitude.   

 

When launching a strike at or near maximum range, it was the practice for the carrier to steam towards the enemy between launching and recovering to reduce the distance required for the planes to fly home by as much as 60 nm on a two-hour mission.

 

The range figures typically are for using auto-lean mixture.  Many pilots are able to squeeze more range out a given amount of fuel by flying slower and using manual-lean mixture.  For instance, the AD/A-1 [Skyraider] that I flew could get four hours at cruise speed from a 300-gallon external fuel tank.  Manual-lean could get 4.5 hours from the same amount of fuel, and a slower speed could stretch that fuel to over five hours if you didn’t care when you got home.

 

Furthermore, the Americans were operating in their home waters with lots of PBY patrols and submarines in the area.  This means that there was a good chance of being rescued if a plane ran out of fuel on the way home.  This doesn’t mean anyone was willing to go on a one-way suicide mission, but there was intense willingness to attack the Japanese fleet and worry about getting home later.

 

The American pilots had a great deal of latitude.  If they found the Japanese carriers, I’m sure they would have used their last gallon of fuel to drop a bomb on a flight deck.  Without contact, they would have headed home with enough fuel to fight another time, although it is hard to say what went through CDR Stanhope Ring’s mind since he lost all his fighters to fuel starvation.

 

In summary, I don’t think the Japanese were relying on distance as protection.  The fact is, they didn’t know the American carriers had already left Pearl Harbor.  They simply got bogged down trying to change plans while avoiding repeated attacks and cycling defensive fighters through the deck.  Once they realized the American fleet was close enough to strike, they had only their fighters for protection, and maybe thought that was enough.

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~ NOW HEAR THIS! ~

 

NEWS & INFO IN THIS ISSUE:

 

-  William Leonard and VF-3/42

-  Featured Link

-  Roundtable On-Line Search Tool

-  Editor’s Notes

 

 

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WILLIAM LEONARD AND VF-3/42   ( see issue #06 )

 

Regarding the matter of William Leonard and the executive officer assignment in VF-3/42: there could be another reason why Leonard was not officially appointed as the squadron XO.  Thach was in VF-3, Leonard was in VF-42, and VF-42 personnel were never formally transferred to VF-3 on the Yorktown.  Therefore, Leonard could not possibly replace Lovelace as the executive officer of VF-3 without being transferred to that squadron, and that didn’t happen.  And he couldn’t be the VF-42 XO, since the squadron already had one, temporarily assigned ashore prior to the BOM.  By default, then, Leonard could only function unofficially as the exec of Yorktown’s patched-together fighter squadron.

 

 

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FEATURED LINK

 

Here’s a photo from Bill Vickrey’s collection that’s truly unique among pictures of BOM veterans:  the last three surviving torpedo plane pilots who made the attack on the Japanese fleet on 4 June 1942.  Left to right: Bert Earnest (VT-8 TBF), George Gay (VT-8 TBD), and Wilhelm “Bill” Esders (VT-3).  This is from the 50th anniversary in June 1992.

 

Click here.

 

 

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ROUNDTABLE ON-LINE SEARCH TOOL

 

Here’s an opportunity for you to play a direct role in the further development of the Roundtable.  Member John Rasor in California has been working on an on-line search tool exclusively for the BOMRT, and he’s refined it to the point where it’s ready for testing by other members.  In fact, your personal experience with the new feature will be vital in determining its usefulness to us and whether we’ll want to make it a permanent fixture on our web site.

 

The search tool has the major advantage of being able to look into every issue of The Roundtable Forum, back to its inception in May 2004.  Additionally, Roundtable archives prior to that (the old e-mail circular) are also searchable to some extent, as are all of the rest of the pages on our site.  Thus, for example, if you want to find everything we’ve ever posted on the subject of “George Gay,” you just put those two words into the search window and you’ll get about a hundred references, any or all of which you can click to read.

 

To try the search tool, click here, or copy and paste this URL into your browser:

 

http://boscohall.org/bomrt-web/krsearch/search_form.html

 

It should be noted that early trials of this search tool have revealed one weakness that hasn’t yet been resolved:  for some reason, it fails with search attempts using Internet Explorer 7 (IE-7).  That might not be a problem for you if you have either IE-8 or the latest version, IE-9.  Searches work fine with IE-8 and -9 as well as with Firefox and other non-Microsoft browsers.

 

If you use IE, you can check to see which version you have by clicking “Help” on the top menu, then “About Internet Explorer.”

 

We are very interested in seeing what your experiences are with this new feature.  Please give it a try and let us know how it worked for you and whether you think it should become a primary feature of our web site.  All comments, pro and con are welcome.

 

When responding, please include the following information:

 

1.  Your computer’s operating system (Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Mac, Linux, other)

2.  The browser you use (IE-7, IE-8, IE-9, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari, other)

3.  Any problem encountered with any search attempt

4.  Your impression as to the value of your searches.  For example, if you were looking for our major article on “Admiral Fletcher at Midway,” did you easily find it with this search tool?  (The specific article is here.)

5.  Any other impressions you’d care to share regarding this feature.

 

When searching a phase consisting of two or more words, remember to put it in quotes, like “George Gay”.

 

Note that all issues of The Roundtable Forum are not yet loaded into the search database.  As of this writing, the files are complete through 2010-29, 3 September 2010.

 

To report your results and impressions of the search tool, click here or draft a new message to midway.rt@gmail.com.

 

 

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EDITOR’S NOTES

 

~  Roundtable member Craig Symonds, a former history professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, has a new BOM book about to be published, and he’s seeking help from the Roundtable in obtaining a key photo for the book.  What’s needed is either a hard-copy print or a high-resolution digital photo of VB-6 commander Richard Best.  There is a familiar image of him available on line, but the resolution is insufficient.  If anyone can help, please contact Craig directly as shown in your “new issue” announcement.

 

~  About that TBD found off the Pacific Coast near San Diego (our featured link in the last issue):  here’s a news article with a video clip about the plane’s pilot.  Interesting tale.  To see it, click here.  (And once again, just ignore the brief scene of a Vindicator being passed off as a Devastator.)

 

~  News of the tsunami’s effect on Midway Atoll:  click here.  (Thanks Bill Vickrey & Kate Dolan.)