The Roundtable Forum

Official Newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable

 

Issue Number 2011-21

21 September 2011    Our 14th Year

 

 

 

~ AROUND THE TABLE ~

 

MEMBERS’ TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE:

 

1.  From Our Archives: Divine Intervention?

2.  Japanese Reaction to the TBF at Midway

 

 

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1.  FROM OUR ARCHIVES:  DIVINE INTERVENTION?

 

Ed. note:  I found this early Roundtable message from Ted Kraver in our files, on the subject of whether the unlikely victory at Midway was the result of “divine intervention.”  While the discussion never rose to the level of a debate, I thought that Ted’s explanation below was as good as any as to why the BOM actually turned out as it did.  Ted’s take was that the battle’s outcome had more to do with the Japanese than with Heaven.

 

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25 January 2003

From:  Ted Kraver

Arizona

 

The number one reason that the Battle of Midway was fought and won by the U.S. had nothing to do with divine intervention.  It was the all too human ego; thoughts and actions of Yamamoto running wild.  He decided on this “all or nothing” attack, muscled the decision against the thoughtful disagreement of just about every other military leader in Japan, and then concocted a plan that was magnificent in complexity that was doomed because of lack of focus, lack of concentration of force, lack of redundancy, and had the requirement that the U.S. forces and his vast fleet must adhere strictly to his plan—statistically impossible as the fog of war, with its human failures, communication breaks, and adversary innovation and creativity started playing out.

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2.  JAPANESE REACTION TO THE TBF AT MIDWAY

 

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18 September 2011

From:  Jeffrey W. Petraska

Michigan

 

Regarding the Torpedo 8 contingent attacking Kido Butai in their new TBF Avengers, what was the IJN reaction to their first encounter with these new planes?  Did they understand at the time that this was a new design?  Did the CAP pilots recognize them for what they were?  Did they come as a surprise, or were they anticipated from Japanese intelligence efforts?

 

Since they attacked from Midway, was it realized that this was a carrier-capable design or did they assume it was a land plane?  And finally, what was the initial IJN assessment of this airplane, if any?

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18 September 2011

From:  Ronald W. Werneth

Illinois

author, Beyond Pearl Harbor

 

Honestly, out of all the IJN Midway veteran aviators and mechanics, not one of them paid any special attention or noted to me anything about the TBF.  I don't recall any detailed feedback that they were "surprised" or even noticed how this aircraft compared to others.

Sorry, I don't have anything helpful, but I would have remembered this, and it would have been in my book.

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18 September 2011

From:   Mark E. Horan

Connecticut

co-author, A Glorious Page In Our History

 

No, I doubt there was even an understanding that the TBF was a new carrier design in relation to the TBD (as opposed to a land-based design) and, even if there was, that that information was retained after the debacle suffered three hours later.

I make the above assessment based on the knowledge that the IJN had extremely limited contact with the TBD itself—they had participated in the Marshalls raid against minimal aerial opposition by land-based naval formations only, at Lae-Salamaua against no aerial opposition (and only half the attacking planes had carried torpedoes), and at Tulagi where again, there was no aerial opposition.  TBDs then participated in both days’ attacks at Coral Sea but while there was carrier opposition, it was only by CarDiv 5, not the heart of Kido Butai.

I am sure that the consolidated intel had fairly good info on the TBD by 4 June at Midway.  However, I doubt very much that the small six-plane formation of TBFs that was all but obliterated by more than twice its numbers of Zero defenders in the brief attack created an impression that survived the resulting disaster suffered a few hours later. 

The overall knowledge of the USN torpedo plane tactics gained by the cumulative war experience to date would have shown no differences between the two types at that point because, for all practical purposes, no one in the USN outside of VT-8 (Detachment) had any actual knowledge of the increased abilities the TBF gave the torpedo plane squadrons in relation to attack doctrine.  That was not gained until the late June to early July interlude when the three carrier torpedo squadrons retained at Pearl and the newly refitted VT-7 on USS Wasp began training in the new plane.

So, in my opinion, the abilities of the new plane would only have been recognized by the IJN in the early stages of Guadalcanal operations, most notably during the Battle of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz.

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~ NOW HEAR THIS! ~

 

NEWS & INFO IN THIS ISSUE:

 

-  Messages Invited for the Roundtable’s 15th Year

-  Featured Link: Lloyd Childers at Squadron Reunion

-  Editor’s Notes

 

 

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MESSAGES INVITED FOR THE ROUNDTABLE’S 15th YEAR

 

Next month, this newsletter will observe the start of the 15th year on the Internet for the Battle of Midway Roundtable.  Members are especially invited to submit comments or articles for that special issue.  Suggested topics might include the Roundtable’s effect upon the evolving history of the battle, the members’ interaction among some of the battle’s best known authors and historians, the experience of associating with actual veterans of the battle, the evolution of the Roundtable itself, or anything else that you might think appropriate for the occasion.

 

Contributions for this special issue are invited from long-term and new members alike, from international members as well as those in the U.S., and especially from Midway veterans.

 

You can include attachments or Internet links if desired.  Publication is tentatively scheduled for the week of October 16 - 22.  I’m looking forward to your comments on this notable occasion.   —RR

 

 

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FEATURED LINK: LLOYD CHILDERS AT SQUADRON REUNION

 

Lt. Col. Lloyd Childers (USMC-Ret) is a very familiar name in most written histories of the BOM, and he’s a familiar face on many video documentaries about the battle.  He’s also been a generous contributor to the Roundtable since its earliest years.

 

Lloyd’s BOM fame came not as a Marine, but as an enlisted Navy gunner in VT-3, the only radioman-gunner of the squadron to survive its attack on Kido Butai as the BOM began.  He transitioned to the Marine Corps thereafter, and served a distinguished career in Marine aviation through Korea and Vietnam.  In the latter conflict, he was the squadron C.O. for HMM-361 (Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361), whose veterans held a 45-year reunion in Portsmouth, New Hampshire this month.  The 90-year old helo skipper made the long journey from northern California to NH for the event, and was extremely well received by his former Marines.  See the link for a fine write-up on the reunion by a local newspaper reporter in Portsmouth.

 

Click here for the featured link..

 

 

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EDITOR’S NOTES

 

~  The Commemorative Air Force (CAF), the famous volunteer organization that restores and flies WW2 aircraft, is now working on a PBY Catalina to be done up with BOM markings and colors.  Completion is expected in 2014, which will make it only the second “Cat” in the world that is still flying.  For more details, click here.

 

~  The latest USN ship to bear the name of Admiral Spruance departed on its maiden voyage September 1st.  For full info from the Navy’s web site, click here.

 

~  I’m flattered over the occasional request I get for a signed copy of No Right to Win, but my personal stock was depleted long ago, and the publisher’s resupply costs were excessive.  But they’ve recently relented, so I’ve restocked and can once again offer signed copies at a favorable price to those who might be interested.  For details, click here then scroll down.