21 February 2010
Issue Number: 2010-07
Our 13th Year
~ AROUND THE TABLE ~
MEMBERS’
TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE:
1.
Judgment Without the Crystal Ball
2. Another Tribute to Robert Swan
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1. JUDGMENT WITHOUT THE CRYSTAL BALL ( see issue #05, 06 )
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12 February 2010
From: CDR Scott I. Smith,
USN-Ret
Washington state
It is too easy to criticize
James Gray for his performance at the BOM, but I wasn't there. My nearly
5000 hours in piston engine aircraft doesn't include the F4F-4, but
a lot of that time was from our great tilting
aerodromes. Thus, I have some idea what I would have been
thinking had I been in his shoes.
First, during the BOM, our
fighter pilots had progressed only a short distance up the learning curve with
respect to the Japanese Zero. Even with the hit and run tactics that
later developed, buzzing around at low altitude attempting to defend the TBDs
would have been a quick way to loose a fighter squadron.
Second, the clouds prevented a
good view of what was actually happening. On a clear day, I might have
considered entering the low-altitude air battle. However, twisting and
turning around those clouds while descending might have put the
fighters outside the battle area and required another large chunk of fuel
just to get into the battle. Besides, the TBDs would probably have been
shot down or on their way home before the fighters could get down to help.
Third, radio communications in
those days was just short of miserable. Lacking any radio contact with
the TBDs, it would be difficult to throw away an altitude advantage that still
might be needed to protect the SBDs. Just because there wasn't any Zeros
in the immediate area didn't mean they weren't sneaking around the clouds
somewhere close.
Finally, I don't think I
would have been shocked at the fuel gage. I suspect
pre-BOM training flights normally landed with about 40 gallons of
fuel. Consuming nearly 100-gallons in 2.5 hours is not abnormal for a
flight at 22,000-feet. That is only about 40-gallons an hour which
indicates a power setting producing an average of about 600 BHP—economical
cruising in the F4F. A lower altitude and slower airspeed would have
used much less fuel, but engaging a Zero without a speed and altitude advantage
was not a smart thing to do.
James Gray should not be
faulted. I have no doubt that he would have gone down to help the
TBDs had he known how badly they were getting mauled, but he had no way of
knowing. The fact that he saw no Japanese CAP at altitude might be
attributed to other reasons. He had no way of knowing about
the crude methods the Japanese used for controlling their CAP.
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12 February 2010
From: Chris Hawkinson
Wisconsin
Dick Best (whom I respect
more than I can put into words) may have maintained that the fighter pilot’s
job was to “die getting the bombers to the target,” but Jimmy Thach stated
“only fighters can keep our carriers afloat.”
Those divergent edicts
sometimes lead to harsh choices. It lead Spruance to send an unescorted
attack against Hiryu on the afternoon of 4 June in spite of the heavy
losses suffered by unescorted strikes made by Enterprise and Hornet
air groups during the morning strike. His decision to protect Task Force
16 at the possible expense of pilots and crew of Bombing Three, Bombing Six,
Scouting Six, Bombing Eight and Scouting Eight meant that many a good man died,
some that maybe wouldn’t have died if an escort had been present. Was
Spruance wrong? Or did he make a command decision that was in the best
interest of Task Force 16?
Gray was responsible, in
part or wholly, for the defense of Scouting Six, Bombing Six, Torpedo Six, and Enterprise
and the rest of Task Force 16. He was responsible for protecting his
charges during this strike and during any additional strikes. He was
responsible for keeping one of four USN fleet carriers afloat and her crew of
2000 USN officers and sailors safe. He had exactly 27 F4F-4s and pilots
with which to accomplish these tasks.
As badly as Torpedo Six and Torpedo Eight were mauled,
and as unfortunate as the lack of support was, Torpedo Six was not Gray’s only
responsibility. On the morning of 4 June as he lost sight of Torpedo
Eight, he also had to worry about 32 SBDs that hadn’t yet shown, and, as
selfish as it sounds, he had to worry about keeping as many as his planes aloft
and his pilots alive as possible for future flights and fights. Blindly
diving to protect unseen TBDs from unseen fighters might have been the ultimate
act of courage, but it also risked one-third of his fighter strength diving into
a fight he couldn’t see. Altitude and speed advantages are not advantages
if you can’t use them to surprise your enemy, and you can’t surprise someone
you can’t see.
Acting courageously doesn’t
make a choice right or wrong, just courageous. Yamaguchi acted very
courageously (and probably incorrectly), and it cost him Hiryu and
hundreds of men. In this case, Gray chose not to dive blindly to help
Torpedo Eight. Rather, he he chose to
wait for McClusky, and if necessary, head for home and preserve his fighter
strength. It certainly wasn’t courageous, but it might not have been
wrong, either.
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12 February 2010
From: John Mattson
California
My personal
guess, totally without direct evidence, is that Gray was low on oxygen and not
thinking very clearly. Not enough to black out, but enough to impair
judgment. In other fights he was
courageous and decisive. Low oxygen would explain a lot, and the oxygen
systems in the F4F were certainly a problem.
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Ed. note: Although it’s nothing more than
conjecture, John’s suggestion is interesting food for thought. Bowen Weisheit, in The Last Flight of
Ensign C. Markland Kelly, goes into great detail about a problem with the
F4F oxygen system, and he theorizes that it affected the judgment of the VF-8
pilots who all ditched without finding the Hornet. Of course, with regard to Gray, there’s no consensus that his
actions on 4 June exhibited any lack of clear thinking or judgment.
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2. ANOTHER TRIBUTE TO ROBERT SWAN
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29 January
2010
From: Randall Crooms
Georgia
I am currently a master's degree candidate at Georgia Southern
University. I am writing my thesis on an aspect of the Battle of Midway;
particularly, the contributions of the island forces (Navy and Marines) in the
victory.
Maybe you will remember my initial contact to you requesting contact
information for any servicemen who were stationed on the island. Among
those names you supplied to me was Commander Robert Swan. I made contact
with Commander Swan and he sent me a package of material along with a
handwritten note expressing gratitude for my interest and thanking me for my
project.
I do my best to check the Roundtable website often, but I have been unable to
for a while. Whenever I am able to
check it, I always double-check the "Veterans List," specifically for
the "Remembrance" section. Tonight, I was humbled and upset by
the fact that I noticed the addition of Commander Swan's name to the "Last
Muster List."
I don't need to tell you, but I would like to say this. Commander Robert
Swan was a good man, a very, good man. We only corresponded one time, but
in that one, I felt an instant friendship.
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Ed. note: the eulogy for long-time Roundtable member
and VP-44 pilot Robert Swan appeared in Roundtable Forum issue #2009-15,
10 April 2009. See his BOM story in No
Right to Win, p. 89-92
~ NOW HEAR THIS! ~
NEWS
& INFO IN THIS ISSUE:
- BOM Anniversary and Unit Reunions
- Link of the Week
- Editor’s Notes
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BOM ANNIVERSARY AND UNIT REUNIONS
We have a large number of additions to the list this week,
thanks to Admirals Mac Showers and John Kirkpatrick. The new items are marked by #. Please note that some entries
don’t have firm dates yet—anyone who learns of those dates is requested to pass
the word.
Please click this link
to add
or update an event to our listing.
E-mail contacts for each event are included in the “new issue”
announcement sent to Roundtable members.
Non-members can request info here.
1. May 26: #NOUS BOM luncheon, Macao’s
Restaurant, Phoenix, AZ.
2. May 31 - June 5: “Return
to Midway” Pearl Harbor symposium and Midway tour. For details, click here (.pdf
file)
3. June 3: NOUS “Dining Out” at Army-Navy Country
Club, Arlington, VA.
4. June 3 - 6: Annual Yorktown
CV-5 reunion, Little Rock, AR.
5. June 4: #USN BOM commemoration at the Navy
Memorial, Washington, D.C.
6. June 4: #Naval War College, BOM
commemoration with Jon Parshall as guest speaker, Newport, RI.
7. June 4: #NOUS “Dining Out” Newport RI (Jon
Parshall also guest speaker at this one).
8. June 4: #NOUS BOM luncheon at the Hess
Club, Houston, TX.
9. June 5: #USN BOM commemoration aboard USS Midway
museum, San Diego, CA
10. June 5: Navy League BOM
luncheon, Phoenix, AZ.
11. June 5: #NOUS “Dining Out” at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
12. June 5: #NOUS “Dining Out” at Marines
Memorial Club, San Francisco, CA.
13. June 6: #NOUS & Navy League “Dining
Out” at Renaissance Center,
World Golf Village, Jacksonville, FL.
14. June ?: (date TBA) #NOUS BOM commemoration, New York,
NY.
15. June ?: (date TBA) #NOUS BOM commemoration, Virginia
Beach, VA.
NOUS = Naval Order of the United States
TBA = to be announced
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LINK OF THE WEEK
Here’s the typewritten BOM after-action report by VMF-221
pilot William Brooks, who survived a head-on encounter with a Zero over the
atoll during the battle. Many thanks to
Bill Vickrey for this copy. (Note: the
small print font can be enlarged in Internet Explorer or Firefox by clicking
the center of the image. You can also download the file and view it
in your image program.)
Click
here for the link of the week.
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EDITOR’S NOTES
~ In the BOM anniversary listings above, a
“dining out” is a formal structured dinner or banquet conducted by the
officers’ mess of a Navy or Marine Corps command or organization on very
special occasions. The “dining out” is
open to guests, while a “dining in” is limited to the officers of the mess
themselves. (For more on the terms we
use here, click the Glossary link below.)
~ Roundtable regulars probably noted that I
missed the usual Friday deadline for this issue. That was due to an unusually heavy workload on other matters,
which is ongoing. Consequently, new
issues of the newsletter are going to be somewhat irregular for the next few
months. By all means, continue sending
in your messages and contributions as usual.
We’ll get back to normal before too long. Right now I’m shooting for March 5th for the next issue.
For a glossary of abbreviations, acronyms, and terms used in The
Roundtable Forum, click here
or go to our home page and click "The Roundtable Glossary" link.
Unless otherwise noted, all
original content in this issue of The Roundtable Forum, the Official
Newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable is copyright 2010 by Ronald
W. Russell (see the “About
the BOMRT” page). Permission to
forward, copy, or quote from this issue is granted if the following citation is
included: “The Roundtable Forum, official
newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable, www.midway42.org.”
Webmasters: we'll appreciate a
link on related web sites. Please link
to our domain name: “http://www.midway42.org.” To download a banner for the purpose, click here.
For
the text of recent back issues of The Roundtable Forum, click here.
For
a complete index of all issues of The Roundtable Forum, click here.
