5 February 2010
Issue Number: 2010-05
Our 13th Year
~ AROUND THE TABLE ~
MEMBERS’
TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE:
1.
“Decision at Midway” by VF-6 C.O. James Gray
2. Bel Geddes’ BOM Dioramas
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1. “DECISION AT MIDWAY” by VF-6 C.O. James Gray ( see issues # 2009-48, 2010-01 thru -04 )
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29 January 2010
From: John B. Lundstrom
Minnesota
author, The First Team, et al
I stand by what I
wrote in The First Team. He was
in a difficult position at Midway once the Enterprise SBDs headed out
alone without him, and I think he did the best he could given the situation he
faced. The recent criticism that he
somehow failed to defend the Yorktown while on CAP has absolutely no
foundation.
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2. BEL GEDDES’ BOM DIORAMAS
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3 February
2010
From: Karen Jensen
Virginia
managing
editor, World War II magazine
For a short piece to accompany an article on the USS Tambor in the
Battle of Midway, I'm interested in finding out if anyone knows anything
specific about what role some dioramas of the battle by the famous industrial
designer Norman Bel Geddes may have played in an official U.S. Navy report of
the battle.
Some of the dioramas were depicted in the February 18, 1946, issue of Life
magazine, along with text that reads "Now, three years later, that battle
has been re-created for an official Navy document. Using a technique developed jointly with Life, Norman Bel Geddes
constructed and photographed 58 scale models of the battle, many of which are
shown on this and the following eight pages."
Bel Geddes's autobiography makes no mention of the project, although an index
says that he "wrote, constructed models and advised in preparation of the
official record of the Battle of Midway for the United States Navy."
Is anyone familiar with this work and know specifically how or if the U.S. Navy
used it? HIstorian Rich Frank tells me
the dioramas definitely did NOT appear in the Naval War College Analysis of
Midway. I'd also be curious to know
what materials Bel Geddes used, and any other details about them that may help
flesh out this piece. I have a deadline
of late this week, and very much hope someone out there knows something about
this.
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Ed. note: you can respond to Karen via her e-mail
address as shown in your “new issue” announcement. For examples of the Bel Geddes BOM dioramas, click here.
~ NOW HEAR THIS! ~
NEWS
& INFO IN THIS ISSUE:
- Judgment Without the Crystal Ball
- Link of the Week
- Editor’s Notes
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JUDGMENT WITHOUT THE CRYSTAL BALL
Military historians have a wonderful advantage in evaluating a major
battle or one of its principal personalities: they know what happened before,
during, and especially after the event.
Hindsight is especially advantageous in judging how the battle was
managed, but it’s obviously an advantage that the on-scene commanders
themselves didn’t have at the time.
What if Robert E. Lee could have known the depth of the Union forces on
the hill facing General Pickett? What
if Kaiser Wilhelm could have imagined an American army joining the French on
the western front? What if Fuchida
could have foreseen the strategic importance of the oil tanks at Pearl Harbor?
And at Midway, what if James Gray could have looked through the clouds
and seen Zeros attacking the TBDs below him?
We sometimes tend to forget that there were no crystal balls at
Midway. The commanders on 4 June 1942
knew nothing more than what existing doctrine determined for them and what
their experience had taught them prior to that date. No one at that time had the advantage of the superior strategy
and tactics that would not be learned until later in the war.
With regard to the matter concerning James Gray and VF-6, then, what
had doctrine and experience taught him prior to the BOM, and what facts existed
immediately before and during his controversial June 4th flight? For starters, the fleet at that time had no
experience that suggested TBDs were critically vulnerable to defending
fighters. In fact, their most recent
battle in the Coral Sea appeared to suggest the opposite: it was the dive
bombers that suffered severe losses there; the TBDs all came back with hardly a
scratch. Yes, you can explain that away
with hindsight, but remember, hindsight didn’t exist on the morning of June
4th, and that’s where we need to put ourselves to make a fair judgment about
Gray and everyone else who was there that day.
The fact is that Gray decided before the battle that he had to provide
cover to the entire Enterprise strike force, both the dive bombers and
the torpedo planes. In view of the
Coral Sea experience plus the known limitations of the F4F-4 vs. the Zero, he
elected to maintain the squadron at high altitude in order to protect the
SBDs. He would dive to the defense of
VT-6 if he was informed by radio that they were in peril. With that advance strategy, he at least had
a contingency plan for protecting the torpedo bombers. That’s in stark contrast to the Hornet air
group, whose leader took them into battle with no provision at all for covering
VT-8.
But Gray’s plan went awry at launch through no fault of his own. Because of a flight deck delay on the Enterprise,
VF-6 didn’t take off until long after McClusky’s SBDs had departed. Unable to find McClusky when finally
airborne, Gray then looked for his TBDs. He briefly saw one group that quickly disappeared, so he decided
to follow another one that he managed to keep in clear view all the way to Kido
Butai.
Over Kido Butai, he remained at high altitude because (a) he assumed
the SBDs were somewhere in the area and, mindful of Coral Sea again, he
believed they would need him there; and (b) he observed no Zeros at his
altitude nor around the TBDs as they disappeared under low cloud cover. With his fuel state approaching the point
of no return and no threat in site, he elected to return to the Enterprise in
order to preserve his 10 fighters for a need that didn’t seem to exist where he
was at that moment.
I’ve seen suggestions that he should have dived through the low clouds
to cover the TBDs in any case—he had to know that they would at least be
receiving AA fire from the ships. Can
we dispose of that notion quickly? The
F4F-4 gives up its only advantage against the Zero by diving to the deck, and
it could do very little against Japanese flak.
Without enemy fighters in view or known, surrendering the altitude
advantage makes no sense.
It’s also been suggested that Gray should have split his squadron like
Thach did in VF-3, with at least a few planes following the TBDs. They then could have called up to Gray for
help as soon as they saw Zeros under the low clouds. But that’s the crystal ball again. Thach’s decision to split his escort was due to conditions unique
to him; being denied the eight planes he wanted in order to maximize his “Thach
Weave” defense. With no 2-plane section
available to pair up with Tom Cheek and Dan Sheedy, it was an easy choice for
Thach to send them down with VT-3. Gray
faced no similar circumstance; he had no reason to believe that splitting his
force would bring any sort of advantage.
Therefore, given Gray’s circumstances at the time, and banning the use
of the crystal ball, there is really no reason for him to have done anything
other than what he did. As for the
animosity that appears to exist for him even at this late date, it would seem
that Gray brought that upon himself through some actions and statements
occurring after June 4th. Dusty
Kleiss told me of a sarcastic radio message Gray sent to VS-6 during the first Mogami-Mikuma
strike, questioning their willingness to dive on the target. It’s understandable that a dive bomber pilot
would remember a slur like that for 68 years.
Gray’s speech at the 1988 BOM symposium didn’t help either, so perhaps
he had a personality quirk that leaves bad memories among some of those who
knew him personally.
But none of that relates to anything that happened in the air off
Midway on 4 June 1942. It seems to me
that a fair assessment of what he saw and what he knew at that time leaves
little room for justifiable criticism.
—RR
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LINK OF THE WEEK
Here’s a video excerpt from an episode of the “World War 2
In Color” TV miniseries. This one is
entitled “The Aircraft Carrier: King of the Pacific,” and has some decent
footage of air operations as well as life in general aboard a WW2 carrier. Most of the clips will be familiar, but the
video quality is excellent and the sound track is in stereo. It runs about 9 minutes. (Thanks to Ted Kraver.)
Click
here for the link of the week.
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EDITOR’S NOTES
~ Here is our list of 68th BOM anniversary
commemorations and related activities that have been reported to us. To add or update an event or for more info, click
here.
1. May 31 - June 5: “Return
to Midway” BOM symposium and Midway atoll tour: click
here (.pdf file)
2. June 3 - 6: Annual Yorktown
CV-5 reunion, Little Rock, AR. Click
here for more info.
For a glossary of abbreviations, acronyms, and terms used in The
Roundtable Forum, click here
or go to our home page and click "The Roundtable Glossary" link.
Unless otherwise noted, all
original content in this issue of The Roundtable Forum, the Official
Newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable is copyright 2010 by Ronald
W. Russell (see the “About
the BOMRT” page). Permission to
forward, copy, or quote from this issue is granted if the following citation is
included: “The Roundtable Forum, official
newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable, www.midway42.org.”
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