22 January 2010
Issue Number: 2010-03
Our 13th Year
~ AROUND THE TABLE ~
MEMBERS’
TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE:
1. E-mail from Howard Ady
2. “Decision at Midway” by VF-6 C.O. James
Gray
3. Why Didn’t Midway Pass Enemy Contact Reports
to Fletcher?
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1. E-MAIL FROM HOWARD ADY ( see issue #02 )
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21 January 2010
From: Alvin B. Kernan
New Jersey
BOM vet, AOM3/c, VT-6, USS Enterprise (CV-6)
The Howard
Ady quote in the last issue seemed to answer a long standing question in the
communications mess at Midway: after sighting Kido Butai, why did the Catalinas
not hang around as per usual and send out additional information on course
changes and such? Fear of Zeros partly, but Ady now tells us that he, and
presumably others on that morning's search had orders after sighting Kido Butai
to fly on to French Frigate Shoals because it was thought the avgas supply at
Midway might have been bombed by the time of the sighting. Were they to
fly there immediately or after their usual scouting procedure? If
immediately, then this would explain why our fleet heard only the first sighting
message and then, with serious consequences, never heard of Nagumo's critical
turn north. Is there more to the Ady BOMRT material that could be
printed?
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Ed. note: I do have a small collection of other
messages from the 1990s that were provided by Ralph Brading. Frankly, there is little of any substance in
them, like the Ady message in the last issue.
Back in those days, everything from every participate on the Roundtable
was forwarded to everyone, so there is a great deal of e-mail that doesn’t
pertain directly to the important issues of the BOM. I will continue to search through them for anything of historical
interest.
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2. “DECISION AT MIDWAY” by VF-6 C.O. James Gray ( see issue # 2009-48, 2010-01, -02 )
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16 January
2010
From: Barrett Tillman
Arizona
author, Clash
of the Carriers, et al
Reference the recent
posts about Gray and VF-6 at the BOM and his comments at the 1988
panel.
“We were at
about 20,000 feet. I looked at my gas
gauge, and expecting to see I had about a quarter of a tank gone. Actually I had about a quarter of a tank
left...One of the first things I learned about flying in an airplane was only
an idiot runs out of gas in an airplane.
If I went down to mix it up, all of us would have landed out of
gas. I had enough gas to get home,
nothing more....”
In my opinion, Gray’s explanation is
unconvincing. Unless he was vastly
unaware, any pilot flying over water keeps an eye (maybe two) on his
fuel gauge. (I certainly did!) Furthermore, VF-6 had received
F4F-4s in late March and over the next two months recognized their limitations,
including endurance. Murray and Halsey endorsed the squadron's comments on
those concerns. Therefore, it strains credulity that Jim Gray, the
experienced squadron commander who insisted only an idiot runs out of gas,
belatedly noticed that he had a quarter of his fuel remaining. That's a
separate issue from whether he might have done any good by exchanging his perch
over Kido Butai to help VT-8 or 6, but it still is cause for question.
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19 January
2010
From: Paul Corio
Kentucky
It’s a
compelling contrast, Jim Gray's "Only an idiot runs out of gas in an
airplane/live to fight another day" attitude versus Dick Best’s response,
in which he said: “the fighter pilot's job is to die getting the bombers to the
target.” These conflicting ideologies
can go a long way in explaining why Gray twice avoided combat on 4 June, while
Best attacked and sank Akagi almost single-handedly.
Best's
“attack at all cost” attitude was obviously shared by John Waldron, who
prioritized neither saving fuel nor his life when he veered off on his own to
find the Japanese, leaving behind his air group, fighter protection, and any
hope of survival. Like Best, Waldron
was willing to sacrifice his life to do his duty: strike the enemy. So as Gray circled high overhead, choosing
to save gas and “live to fight another day,” Waldron was attacking the greatest
armada ever to sail.
Gene
Lindsey and Lem Massey led their squadrons on their own sacrificial
forays. These three VT commanders and
65 of their men made the ultimate sacrifice that day, but hardly in vain, for
we all know the crucial role the VTs played in occupying the enemy’s CAP and
delaying their launch proceedings, setting the table and timing perfectly for
the SBDs. But this “Miracle at Midway”
only happened because of men who were hell bent on sacrificing all to
hit the enemy.
Now we learn that Gray
refused to engage Yorktown‘s attackers, citing his duty to protect Enterprise,
which was not under attack. As
before, when he had compelling evidence that TBDs were engaged in combat far
below, Gray heeded the “duty” that kept him out of harm’s way. It seems that Gray, in the complete antithesis
of his heroic brethren, was indeed determined to fight another day—any day but
4 June 1942.
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3. WHY DIDN’T MIDWAY PASS ENEMY CONTACT REPORTS TO FLETCHER?
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22 January
2010
John T.
Leyland
Illinois
I wondered why Midway did not pass the enemy
position info from the Midway aircraft to Admiral Fletcher. Obviously, they didn't have to worry about
radio silence, or if they did, they could have passed it to Nimitz via the
cable for rebroadcast. It is
interesting that under the pressure of combat, people seem to forget to pass
intelligence upward.
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Ed. note: The forces on Midway did
not try to communicate with Fletcher because they were not aware of any U.S.
fleet units in the area until VB-8 aircraft landed on the atoll around
1100. That was deliberate--CINCPAC feared the possibility that the
Japanese invasion might succeed. There was a hazard that
U.S. personnel captured on Midway might give up critical intelligence to
the enemy under interrogation.
~ NOW HEAR THIS! ~
NEWS
& INFO IN THIS ISSUE:
- Remembering Roy Gee
- Link of the Week
- Editor’s Notes
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REMEMBERING ROY GEE ( see issue #01 )
A memorial service for VB-8 pilot Roy Gee was held aboard
USS Midway at San Diego on January 8th.
His BOM squadron mate and lifelong friend Clay Fisher was invited to
deliver a portion of the eulogy. Here
are Clay’s remarks:
“Janette, Skip , other members of your family, Admiral Monger, and other persons
attending this memorial for Captain Roy Gee: I wish to say a few words to
reminisce about Roy’s and my relationship as a shipmate, fellow naval aviator,
and friend.
“Roy and I both met our brides–to-be in Norfolk. I don’t know how Roy met Janette but she did
fix up ‘KB’ White, another squadron pilot and close friend of Roy and myself,
with dates from her group of
girlfriends. Later I met my
bride-to-be Anne Koster at the NAS Norfolk officers club. I believe Roy married Janette during the
Christmas holidays in 1942 and I married Annie in February of 1942. Both our marriages have lasted 67 years.
“Roy and I shared some experiences that I would like to
mention. After we finished carrier
operational flight training at NAS Opa Locka, Florida in the late summer of
1941, Roy and I were ordered to Bombing Squadron Eight based aboard USS Hornet,
which was commissioned at NAS Norfolk in October 1941. We both became qualified carrier pilots
during the Hornet’s shakedown cruise in the Gulf of Mexico in January of
1942.
“We both flew on each of the five attack missions launched
from the Hornet during the three-day Battle of Midway in June of
1942. I witnessed Roy’s direct bomb hit
on a Japanese heavy cruiser on the afternoon of June 4th. In dive bomber pilot’s jargon, he ‘nailed
it.’
“Roy and I were launched off the Hornet on October
26th, 1942 in the initial combat strike of 15 dive bombers against two Japanese
aircraft carriers during the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in the South
Pacific. When we manned our planes I
thought our flight was going to be a suicide mission as we were only assigned
four fighters to protect our dive bombers.
We were under constant attack by Japanese Zero fighters the last 70
miles, and after our recovery from our dives on an enemy carrier. Amazingly, 14 of us pilots and our rear
gunners survived. The Hornet was
sunk by Japanese dive bombers and torpedo aircraft. Roy was able to land aboard the Enterprise and I had to
ditch alongside a cruiser.
“With Roy’s passing I’m now the sole surviving pilot of
Bombing Squadron Eight.
“Janette, I’ve always missed the camaraderie I shared with
Roy and other naval aviators during our active duty and retirement years. To Roy...as they say goodbye or
farewell in Japanese...Sayonara.”
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LINK OF THE WEEK
Here’s another group of
photos from the Life Magazine archives, this time showing pre-war views of VT-6
TBDs. Click the thumbnail images to the
right of the large picture to view many additional photos. Thanks to William Reece for finding this set
for us.
Click
here for the link of the week.
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EDITOR’S NOTES
~ There’s no gentle way to say this, so our
members who fondly remember Chaplain Stan Linzey for his extensive involvement
on the Roundtable and at BOM commemorations should know that he apparently has
little chance of winning his fight against cancer. He is waging a courageous struggle and deeply appreciates the
kind words he is receiving from his friends from all corners of the nation and beyond. You can send e-mail messages for him to the
address shown in your “new issue” announcement, and they will be delivered to
Stan by a family member. Otherwise, his
U.S. mail address is:
Stanford E. Linzey
Life Care Center #109
1980 Felicita Road
Escondido CA 92025 USA
For a glossary of abbreviations, acronyms, and terms used in The
Roundtable Forum, click here
or go to our home page and click "The Roundtable Glossary" link.
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original content in this issue of The Roundtable Forum, the Official
Newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable is copyright 2009 by Ronald
W. Russell (see the “About
the BOMRT” page). Permission to
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