THE
ROUNDTABLE FORUM
Official newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable
9 October 2009
Issue
Number: 2009-39
Our 13th Year
~
AROUND THE TABLE ~
MEMBERS’
TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Stanhope Ring’s “Lost Letter of Midway”
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1. STANHOPE RING’S “LOST LETTER
OF MIDWAY”
Ed note: this issue is a departure from our usual
format. A few days ago I received from
a friend of Stanhope Ring’s family a copy of the Hornet air group
commander’s “lost letter of Midway.”
The letter isn’t new, as it was featured in a U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
article in August 1999, and it’s also found on the No Right to Win supplementary
CD. But except for the version on the
CD, I don’t recall seeing the letter published in its entirety without inserted
editorial comments, such as in the Proceedings article.
The letter was apparently handwritten by Ring in 1946, then filed away in
his personal effects without being sent to anyone. It was discovered by his daughter while she was examining the
contents of an old sea chest. Why Ring
never did anything with the letter is pure conjecture, but it first became
public knowledge with the publication of Captain Bruce Linder’s article in Proceedings.
The letter is obviously of great interest on the Roundtable, as it documents
Ring’s version of exactly what happened on the HAG’s “flight to nowhere.” The
first question many might ask is, upon what course does Ring say he led his
planes: southwest (240 degrees true, as per Hornet’s official
after-action report) or west (265 degrees true, as postulated by Bowen
Weisheit)? The letter indicates that
Ring didn’t see that as any sort of controversy, merely stating that “Upon arrival at
the line between the last reported position of the enemy and Midway” he turned
the air group south on the assumption Kido Butai was closing with the
atoll. To get to a point “between the
last reported position of the enemy and Midway,” Ring would have to have been
on the southwest course (240), the same as the Enterprise air group.
But then there is a particularly interesting comment that most readers
have probably passed over without much thought: “Hornet Group proceeded south until
smoke from Midway was sighted.” Smoke
from Midway was sighted? This is
only the third report I’ve seen of anyone sighting Midway’s smoke, the first
two being from McClusky’s outbound flight (Miracle at Midway, p. 259)
and from Clay Fisher’s observation while flying wing on the group commander, as
Clay reported in last week’s newsletter.
If Ring truly saw Midway’s smoke at any point during his flight, then he
was not on course 265.
In any case, here is Ring’s “lost letter,” from beginning to end.
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28
March 1946
There has been much written about the Battle of Midway and in many respects
there has been a startling lack of accuracy. This is an attempt, almost four
years after the action, to set down in black and white my best recollections of
what occurred.
Hornet and Enterprise [CV-6] had been operating together during May 1942. The
Battle of Coral Sea had been fought without our participation. We were guarding
against a Japanese advance toward Australia or the Solomon Islands. Extensive
daylight searches were run but it appeared to me that we were making no great
effort to deny to the enemy knowledge of our presence in those waters. As a
matter of fact, Japanese reconnaissance planes were known to have made contact
with our force.
Probably
as a result of interception of Japanese "high command" traffic, both
Hornet and Enterprise were suddenly ordered to return to Pearl Harbor. We proceeded at high speed maintaining air
searches en route.
We remained in the Pearl area for a very short period -- about twenty-four
hours as I recall - and then sailed for the vicinity of Midway.
Early on the morning of 4 June we received
word that the Japanese attacking force had been located and that initial attack
on Midway had been made. Course from Hornet's position to the enemy was plotted
and immediate preparations made to launch the Air Group.
It was decided to launch the entire group as a striking force and to adhere
strictly to the doctrine of radio silence. VT Squadron 8 was to proceed at low
level. VB-8, VS-8, accompanying fighters of VF-8 and the Group Commander were
to proceed at high level (20,000 ft.). Nearly one and a half hours were
consumed in Group rendezvous after launching. All airplanes maintained moderate
altitude (below 5,000 ft) until after rendezvous of the Group was effected.
Departure
from Hornet was taken on preestimated interception course, Group Commander
leading. High altitude elements commenced their climb.
Within thirty minutes after departure from Hornet scattered cumulous clouds
intervened between high and low elements. Speed of high elements was regulated
in an attempt to remain above the invisible VT-8.
Upon
arrival at the line between the last reported position of the enemy and Midway
Island, since the high group had made no contact, I decided that I should proceed
on the assumption that the enemy was closing Midway and directed the course of
the high element accordingly.
It is appropriate at this time to interject my understanding that Enterprise
Group was favored with later information of the whereabouts of the enemy than
was Hornet Group. Although communications in 1942 were most unreliable between
air and surface craft, even though Hornet might have broken radio silence to
keep the Group informed of the latest developments, there was no assurance that
such information would have been received by the Group. As a matter of fact, I
do not believe that Hornet received the reported new position of the enemy.
Therefore my change of Air Group course to the south was based entirely on my
estimate of the situation (which proved faulty) and not on definite information
of the enemy movements.
VT-8
and Enterprise Group made contact with the enemy, north of the point at which I
turned south. Again, reliable communications should have permitted direction of
the high elements of the Hornet Air Group to the point of contact.
Hornet Group proceeded south until smoke from Midway was sighted. At that time
it was apparent that immediate return to the carrier was necessary if landings
aboard were to be effected, since fuel supply was running low.
Great
reliance was placed on the YE homing beacon. I switched radio at the time to
the homing frequency but Enterprise was all that could be heard. The letter
signal received, compared to the YE letter chart furnished us by Hornet prior
to takeoff, convinced me that something was wrong. It later developed that
Enterprise and Hornet were on different YE homing codes and that the change in
code prescribed by CTF in Enterprise had not been received by Hornet. Because of the obvious discrepancy in
Enterprise YE signal received as applied to the YE homing chart of Hornet, I
disregarded the YE signal and attempted to change course of the group toward
the dead reckoning position of Hornet VS-8 under Lt Cdr. Rodee followed me in
my change. VB-8 under Lt Cdr. Johnson appeared to follow the false course
indicated by YE signal and was followed by VF-8, Lt Cdr. Mitchell. I left VS-8
and attempted to rally the departing aircraft of VB-8 and VF-8 in order to lead
them back to Hornet but I could not catch them. When I finally gave up the
chase VS-8 had disappeared from sight and VB-8 was apparently headed for
Midway. I then resumed my dead reckoning course to intercept Hornet, proceeding
singly at 20, 000 ft. Since oxygen supply was failing and I began to notice the
effects of lack of oxygen, I dropped gradually to 10, 000 ft.
Eventually, I sighted aircraft below me and noticed water landings of at least
two airplanes.
After about 4.5 hours in the air (and having assured Parker, my radioman, that a
water landing could be easily effected), I sighted the white wakes of a Task
Force at high speed. Further investigation revealed it to be our own force. I
made a wide approach to arrive within the "recognition sector".
Hornet turned into the wind and received me aboard. VS-8 had landed; VB-8, VT-8
and VF-8 were missing. It later developed that VT-8 had, with the exception of
Ens. [George H.] Gay been lost in an attack on the Japanese carriers. Lt Cdr
Waldron leading the squadron had courageously and in the face of certain
destruction led his command in a torpedo attack against the enemy. VB-8 had
(with the loss of two planes) landed at Midway. VF-8 had apparently landed at
sea, out of fuel.
I was shaken at the realization of such losses and will admit that I was in
poor condition to take the air in a renewed attack on the Japanese carriers
which had, by then, been located. About one hour after my landing the remaining
aircraft of the Group were ordered launched for the next attack.
Both Rodee and I were spotted on the hangar deck so, when launchings were
suddenly terminated after the aircraft on the flight deck had taken off, the
"Group" command devolved upon Lt. Stebbins of VS-8. He did a
magnificent job of locating and attacking the enemy forces and is wholly
deserving of all the credit for the success of the operation as far as Hornet
Group was concerned.
It is
my recollection that launching was stopped after the planes on the flight deck
had taken off because of the reported approach of enemy aircraft. At any rate,
it was at about this time that Yorktown was attacked. Damage to that carrier
required landing part of Yorktown air group aboard Hornet. One of the planes of
that group, the pilot having been wounded in the foot, made a bad landing, his
right wheel collapsed and the airplane slewed toward the island. The pilot had
failed to turn off his gun firing switch and as the deck crash occurred the 50
cal guns cut loose, firing into the island. Several of our personnel, including
Lt. Royal Ingersoll were killed and several were wounded. Later in the
afternoon, a second Yorktown pilot landed with firing switch on, but the plane
made a normal landing the resultant firing passed safely along the flight deck
and not into the ship. It was at the start of this second firing that Capt
Mason (makee-learn Captain and prospective relief for Capt Mitscher) knocked me
flat on the deck of the port wing of the bridge to escape the possible line of
fire. I don't know whether his thoughtful but rough treatment was more of a
shock than the actual firing or not.
Our attack group returned before dark and gave glowing accounts of the damage
done to the enemy.
The Task Force retired during the night, in an easterly direction. I believe
that it was during the forenoon of the 5th of June that we received flyable
airplanes of VB-8 that had landed the day before at Midway. Airplanes of VF-8
that accompanied the initial attack group were unaccounted for, but several
days later all but two of the pilots were recovered by PBYs.
Reports concerning the enemy were meager on 5 June, but in mid-afternoon
contact report was received on an enemy carrier "disappearing to the
westward into a front." Hornet and Enterprise Air Groups were launched to
search and attack. We searched to the extreme range of 325 miles from Hornet
but discovered nothing except one light cruiser. On the way out on the search
we flew over the scene of 4 June attack on Japanese CVs and observed many
survivors in the water.
Since the search for the carrier proved negative we returned to attack the CL
which was about 275 miles from our task force. Although AA fire was neither
excessive nor uncomfortably accurate, the dive bombing attack was a fizzle. I
never saw a ship go through such radical maneuvers at such high speed as did
that Jap. We completed our attack shortly after sunset and started the long
trip home.
Group
doctrine had called for individual return rather than complete rendezvous. This
was a mistake, perhaps, in the absence of air opposition, but under the circumstances
was essential since diminishing fuel supply precluded wasting time and fuel to
get the group together, Ens. White of VS-8 joined me on the return trip.
Hornet Group had never qualified in night landings aboard, which fact would be
expected to cause some concern under the circumstances. Actually, the night
landings were themselves made without incident or difficulty. One plane of
VS-8, Lt. Davis pilot, ran out of gasoline in the groove and made a water
landing, but personnel were picked up by plane guard destroyer.
It proved fortunate for me that Ens. White had joined company because when I
lowered my wheels preparatory to landing, he by frantic signaling to me got
across the idea that only one wheel was extended. My first thought was that a
fragment of shell from the AA fire of the cruiser had damaged an hydraulic line
but after a bit of violent maneuvering both wheels extended properly.
There was a general mix-up of pilots that night. Some Enterprise crews landed
aboard Hornet and some of our people landed aboard Enterprise. Despite the
possible presence of Japanese submarines, Captain Mitscher had illuminated the
ship in order to get us all back. There was no one lost in the operation nor
were any injuries incurred. Duration of flight: 4.3 hours.
During
the forenoon of 6 June we received a contact report on an enemy force, distant
about 150 miles, retiring to the westward. Hornet Air Group was launched to
search and attack.
On the way out toward the enemy, I received a CW message from Hornet stating
that enemy force might consist of cruisers rather than carriers as first
reported. In as much as we believed that all enemy carriers had been sunk on 4
June this made sense and since we did not expect air opposition to our attack
we cruised at medium rather than high altitude (approximately 14,000 feet).
During these operations “first name" calls were used, so that when VB-8
which was on the left flank of our scouting line, sighted the enemy, Lt. Cdr
Johnson called on the voice radio: "Stanhope from Robert, enemy below on
port bow." As an indication of how alert the Japanese were, in a very
short time the following message in very oriental tone came over the air:
"Stanhope from Robert, Return to base."
In executing our dive bombing attack, everyone did much better than he had the
day before, when buck fever probably had us. Hits were registered on each of
the two large cruisers (Mogami class) and the escorting destroyers were bombed
and strafed. On the way back to Hornet~ I detoured about 25 miles to the
southward to see if any other enemy were in the area. None was sighted.
When I
returned aboard after about 3 hours flying it developed that the radio in my
plane was not functioning properly. Hornet had not received my report of
attacking the enemy nor had I received their dispatches requesting information
as to the latitude and longitude of the Group attacked. Capt. Mitscher decided,
therefore, that I should not accompany the final attack group which was being
readied for takeoff. Unfortunately, Ens. Griswold, a very promising pilot of
VB-8 had been lost during the morning attack, probably the victim of AA fire.
Other aircraft of the Group were slightly damaged by AA fire.
While Hornet Group was preparing for the second launch, Enterprise Group attacked
a cruiser task force. It is not definitely known whether it was the same force
Hornet had attacked or not.
Hornet's second attack was even more successful than the first and the group
had the satisfaction of witnessing a terrific explosion aboard one of the
cruisers. Later intelligence indicated that Mikuma was sunk as a result of this
attack.
At
this point, fuel in escorting destroyers was running dangerously low, darkness
was approaching, and CTF decided to break off the engagement. We had lost Yorktown,
Hammann [DD-412], VT-8, and many other pilots but the Japanese had
suffered heavily. Undoubtedly the cream of their naval aviation was destroyed
in the sinking of their four carriers. We felt then (as was later proved) that we
had dealt the Japanese a decisive defeat.
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