THE ROUNDTABLE FORUM
Official newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable
"To promote awareness and understanding of the great battle and to honor the men who fought and won it."
10 SEPTEMBER 2006.........ISSUE NO. 2006-37..........OUR 9th YEAR
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* * * Around the Table * * *
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MEMBERS' TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE
1. New BOM TV Documentary
2. Remembering Phil Jacobsen
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"NEW BOM TV DOCUMENTARY" (see issue #36)
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7 September 2006
From: Dick Epps repps846@yahoo.com
(BOM vet, RM3/c, USS Aylwin, DD-355)
I watched and recorded Days That Shook the World: the Battle of
Midway. My first
impression is that they claimed that the IJN operation plan was developed
by VADM Nagumo--we know it was written by ADM Yamamoto. Then one
gets the impression that LCDR Best was in charge of the SBDs in the attack on
the Kaga and the Akagi. I think that they should have
mentioned LCDR McClusky, who was commander of
the Enterprise air group and who made first [visual] contact with
the IJN carriers by the SBDs. Of
course, Best was one of the outstanding heroes of BOM, but they should have mentioned McClusky.
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Ed. note: see "Now Hear This" below
for a full review of the program.
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"REMEMBERING PHIL JACOBSEN" (see issue #35, 36)
Ed. note: in a final tribute to Phil, here is a
reprint of one of his best contributions to the Roundtable, on a subject
that was his passion for many of his final years.
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2 November 2002
From: Phil Jacobsen (BOM vet, RM3/c,
intercept operator, Combat Intel. Unit, Pearl Harbor)
Robert Stinnett, in his book Day of Deceit has
claimed that many messages from Admiral Yamamoto relative to the Pearl Harbor
attack are being withheld by the National Archives. He cites missing Station Message Serial (SMS) numbers from the
list of 1945-46 decrypts and translations as evidence to support that
allegation as well as his claim of violations of radio silence [by the Japanese
fleet on the way to Pearl Harbor].
On page 104 of Midway, the Battle That Doomed
Japan, Fuchida and Okumiya state that "the telephone cable linking the
flagship [of Admiral Yamamoto] with the shore hummed with a constant stream of
messages...as the Fleet Headquarters maintained close liaison with the Naval
General Staff in Tokyo and made arrangements with the Kure Naval Base for ship
repairs, maintenance and supply."
Of course, Fuchida and Okumiya were talking about the preparations for
the Battle of Midway, but the same communication cable facilities were
undoubtedly available to Yamamoto some six months earlier when the planning for
the attack on Pearl Harbor was being made.
This is in addition to blinker and guard mail messenger services available
to all ships at all naval bases.
Various revisionist conspiracy theorists have
maintained that the Pearl Harbor strike force (Kido Butai) must have violated
radio silence to maintain station at sea and to acknowledge messages sent to it
on the Tokyo fleet broadcast, even though official Japanese navy records show
all inter-fleet messages were sent by blinker or flag hoist and no radio
acknowledgements back to Tokyo for broadcast messages were made. Also, there is documentation that a dozen or
so top commanders confirmed that no such radio signals were ever sent and they
detail the extraordinary methods used to prevent such accidental transmissions.
On page 122, Fuchida and Okumiya describe the transit
of the Second Carrier Striking force assigned to the Aleutians prong of the
Midway offensive from Ominato in northern Japan to the Aleutians. It notes that, "the [northern attack]
force encountered a dense and seemingly endless fog, which made it difficult to
keep formation, since none of the ships was equipped with radar and strict radio
silence was in force. Even so, the fog
was not entirely unwelcome, for it lessened the danger of discovery by enemy
submarines known to be lurking in the waters east of Hokkaido."
There were only about 25 ships in the combined
Dutch Harbor strike force and the Attu landing and support forces, as opposed
to about 33 or so ships in the Kido Butai.
Still, this documented confirmation of radio silence by a much less
secret operation than the Pearl Harbor attack force further dispels the
agenda-driven revisionist suppositions that it was absolutely necessary for the
Kido Butai to constantly violate radio silence merely to maintain station at
sea, and that such transmissions were fixed as to location by U.S. Navy direction finders.
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Here's a last call for Roundtable members
to post entries in Phil's memorial guest book on the San Diego
Union-Tribune web site. Please add any comments that you'd
care to leave for Phil's family:
http://www.legacy.com/signonsandiego/Obituaries.asp?Page=Lifestory&PersonId=19003017
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* * * Now Hear This! * * *
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NEWS & INFO IN THIS ISSUE
--Review: Days That Shook the World: the Battle of Midway
--Forum Notes
--TV This Week
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REVIEW: DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD:
THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY (see issue #36)
This British production (shown on the History
Channel, September 5th) stands out from all of the rest in that it is not just
a straight documentary—numerous key scenes are dramatized by actors playing the
roles of some of the BOM’s principal figures, such as Simard, Spruance,
Waldron, Gay, Best, Nagumo, Tomonaga, and Yamaguchi. Such dramatizations add a great deal of interest to the
production, which otherwise would simply be another BOM documentary,
and not a very accurate one at that.
But on the Roundtable we're
not just interested in a production that's entertaining--it also has to be
faithful to the battle's factual history. This program manages that
in a very general sense, but it fails quite significantly in many of the
details. While that's more or less common with virtually all of the
earlier BOM films and videos, this one was made in 2005, long after the
failings of those earlier efforts had been identified and long after modern,
reliable references on the BOM had become available. That being the case,
the type and quantity of the glitches found in this production seem
particularly difficult to explain away or justify.
The producers apparently used two
primary sources for their program, John Ford's classic Battle of Midway short film and the Navy's
familiar "Torpedo Squadron 8" movie clip, filmed on the Hornet a couple of weeks before
the battle. Most of the archive scenes are from those two films, and the
script seems to be built mainly around their content, especially the
John Ford movie.
As for the age-old problem of
wrong ships and planes, this one is actually not too bad in that
regard. There were numerous scenes of F4Fs, TBDs, SBDs, PBYs and
Zeros, including good shots of some modern restorations in flight. The
Hellcats, ship-launched TBFs, and Essex-class carriers that we
usually see weren't there this time, except for one distant shot of an Essex taking a hit while the
narrator was talking about bombs striking Akagi. Some of the aircraft had pre-BOM
or 1943 markings, but that's to be expected.
However, what was not expected was
the extent to which this program erred with much of the BOM's
history. Here are just some of the problems that I noted:
-- The program begins with a claim that it is based
on eyewitness accounts and "new operational evidence." The
"new operational evidence" is not defined, and you will be
hard-pressed to find anything in the production that is both new and
factual.
-- Throughout the program, the narrator constantly
refers to Midway as "Midway Island." One
island, that is. It is never an atoll with two main
islands. Captain Simard is described as making preparations to defend
"his island."
-- The narrator stated that "should Midway fall
to the Japanese, the enemy will have a foothold to attack the mainland of the
United States." We've seen a lot of predictions about the results of
a Japanese victory at Midway, but to my knowledge no one has ever gone
that far. This statement is wholly unjustified, even outlandish.
-- A major criticism of the program: they made
almost no mention of the importance of communications intelligence at the
BOM, and one thing they did say they got wrong: "the Americans
broke the Japanese naval code a few weeks before the battle."
-- Pilots such as Howard Ady and Richard Best were
shown communicating with their base or task force by speaking into a voice
radio microphone. That certainly didn't happen aboard the PBYs, and with
the exception of some of the fighters, it didn't happen in the carrier air
groups. (Of course, movie producers always show it that way for dramatic
effect, but if historical accuracy counts for anything, scenes of enlisted
aviation radiomen tapping out contacts on their telegraph keys would have been
a better choice.)
-- One scene showed RADM Spruance transmitting
directly to the PBYs from the Enterprise. Not hardly!
-- USN officers inside the Enterprise flag bridge are shown
saluting each other, uncovered (no hats or other headgear). The Army does
that, but not the Navy. Salutes are only rendered when covered, and
ordinarily never inside a confined space.
-- Japanese bombers approaching Midway are said to
have appeared "out of nowhere." That would have been surprising
to the Marine radar operators on Sand Island who spotted them 93 miles out.
-- There was no mention of the strikes by the
Marine, Navy, and Army bombers and torpedo planes from Midway.
Vindicators (from the Ford movie) are shown taking off without explanation.
-- John Ford is shown being struck down by a Japanese
bomb, his camera knocked from his hand. The narrator says that he
suffered "shrapnel wounds to his arm." In reality, Ford
actually didn't know he'd been hit (most likely by a small concrete fragment)
until after the battle when he noticed a minor wound on his upper arm. It
was treated with a Band-Aid. "Ford is lucky to have survived,"
the narrator says.
-- Waldron is shown at the rail of his ship on the
morning of June 4th, wearing his working khaki (shipboard) uniform and a Mae
West. He'd have to take off the Mae West to put on his flight suit, after
which he'd put on his Mae West.
-- Waldron and VT-8 are said to have launched
on June 4th "after a final photo call." The scene then
shifts to their familiar filming in mid-May. While literally correct
(June 4th was after mid-May), the clear inference is that the pilots lined
up in two rows for a quick photo op, then donned their flight suits and sped
off to battle.
-- The narrator says that Waldron "followed Spruance's
course only so far" before breaking away in a different
direction. The program makes no mention of Ring or Mitscher,
nor is there any mention of the Hornet or its air group except for
VT-8.
-- After VT-8's planes are all shot down, the
narrator says that "by 9:38, all thirty pilots of Torpedo 8 had
crashed into the Pacific."
-- There is no mention of torpedo planes from the Enterprise or Yorktown.
-- As usual, George Gay is described as the
"sole survivor" of VT-8 at the BOM. Gay, of course, was the
squadron's third survivor that morning.
-- The narrator states that the Enterprise "prepares to launch
its strike" while we are treated to a scene of a carrier with its aircraft
spotted forward on the flight deck, ready for recovery operations.
-- Another major criticism: as mentioned above
by Dick Epps, this program was wholly focused on Richard Best and VB-6, insofar
as the American dive bombers are concerned. There was absolutely no
mention of Wade McClusky or VS-6. One brief clip showed Best receiving
radio instructions from "the group commander," who is not otherwise
identified. There was also scant reference to dive bombers from the Yorktown. The names of LCDR Leslie
and VB-3 never came up. Viewers are almost led to believe that Best and
VB-6 won the entire battle by themselves. The narrator at one point even
goes so far as to say that "for the Americans, all hope rides with
Richard Best and Bombing 6."
-- Along the same line, Best is credited with first
spotting the Japanese carriers, more or less by chance. Nothing is said
about the Nautilus and the Arashi pointing the way (which is
understandable, since that would have required mentioning McClusky).
There were several more errors
tallied in my notes, but I have to bring this lengthy article to a close at
some point. Before I do, it's only fair to say that the program was
actually very good in many regards. Again, the dramatizations of BOM
events were refreshing and mostly done rather well, especially with regard to
the portrayal of John Ford. The actor who played the part of
Japanese admiral Yamaguchi was particularly good--he looked and acted very much
like the aggressive warrior that the admiral is said to have been. (On
the other hand, the actor who played Nagumo looked more like Jackie Gleason
than Nagumo.)
In closing, readers may think that
I've gone a little too far in criticizing this program, but I believe all of
the criticism is warranted. This is the twenty-first century; the time
for excusing simple errors like those above has passed. At this late
date, the producer of a BOM film who doesn't bother to look up the
battle's details in reliable references, nor engage the aid
of experienced consultants (and pay attention to what they tell him!)
cannot expect unqualified acceptance of his flawed production.
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FORUM NOTES
~ One more word about the Days That Shook the World video: I've added it to the "Midway Library" page on our web site, under the "Videos" heading, and without the detailed criticism. I've also added a brief review of the PBS Battlefield episode about the BOM, which ironically is far superior despite being eleven years older.
Since the Days That Shook the World video apparently cannot be purchased anywhere, I've made a VHS copy of it that's available for loan. Send me your request if you'd like to borrow it.
~ Here's a repeat of the invitation to all members concerning the Roundtable's 9th anniversary next month: send me a message that describes what the Roundtable has meant to you since you came aboard. Everyone is invited to participate, whether you're new to us or joined in the previous century. All comments are welcome, be it praise, complaints, or anything in between. What has the Roundtable or the Forum accomplished that you find worthy of mention as we start our tenth year? What should we have done better, or what should we try that's new? Your submissions will appear in the Forum throughout October. I've received some nice entries since the original announcement last week, and look forward to getting yours. (Note: please enter "9th Anniversary" on the subject line of your message.)
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TV THIS WEEK
Here are television listings of possible interest for the period of Sep 11 - 18 (eight days). The times shown below may not be the same in your area--be sure to check your local guide.
Channels:
AMC = American Movie Classics
DC = Discovery Channel
HC = History Channel
FNC = Fox News Channel
PBS = Public Broadcasting System
TCM = Turner Classic Movies
Note: "12:00 AM" means midnight at the start of the indicated date (0000 hours). "12:00 PM" means noon.
Tue, Sep 12
12:00 PM (HC) Pacific: the Lost Evidence: Okinawa
6:00 PM (HC) Pacific: the Lost Evidence: Okinawa (repeated)
Fri, Sep 15
8:00 PM (HC) Dogfights (the original episode)
Sat, Sep 16
12:00 AM (HC) Dogfights (repeated)
5:00 PM (AMC) Tora, Tora, Tora (1970)
Sun, Sep 17
8:00 AM (AMC) Tora, Tora, Tora (1970)
11:30 AM (AMC) The Enemy Below (1957)
Mon, Sep 18
2:15 AM (AMC) The Enemy Below (1957)
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For a glossary of abbreviations, acronyms, and terms used in The Roundtable Forum, click the following URL or go to our home page and click "The Roundtable Glossary" link.
http://www.midway42.org/glossary.htm
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