The Roundtable Forum
Official
newsletter of the
BATTLE OF MIDWAY ROUNDTABLE
"Dedicated
to preserving the memory of the great battle
and
honoring the men who fought it."
27 JUNE 2004
......................... Issue No. 2004-09 .........................
Our 7th Year
Note:
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AROUND
THE TABLE
MEMBERS' TOPICS IN THIS ISSUE
1. The Hornet Air Group at the
BOM
2. Why I Joined the Roundtable
=========================================
"The
Hornet Air Group at the BOM" (see Clay Fisher, issue 4-01;
Tom Cheek, issue 4-02; Now Hear This, issue 4-02)
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18 June 2004
From: Clay Fisher
cfisher3@san.rr.com (BOM vet,
VB-8 pilot, USS Hornet)
I was a dive bomber pilot in VB-8 from a couple months before the Hornet
Air Group was officially designated and the Hornet was commissioned on
18 October 1941 at NAS Norfolk. I want
to review some of the facts about our air group and squadron training or lack
of training. I became an operational
flight instructor in dive bombers, fighter, and later night fighters in
1943-45, and then realized how badly trained we really were in 1941-42.
I commenced flight training in February 1941, and was commissioned an ensign
and received my wings in August. Quite
a few of my primary flight instructors were "plough
backs"—instructors who had just completed their own flight training. The flight training program was expanding so
rapidly that there was a real shortage of experienced flight instructors. I had a "plough back" for a flight
instructor and he wasted some of my flight instruction by "flat
hatting"—flying low over some poor farmer's chicken farm and panicking the
chickens!
I usually received a down check on my first flight check in each phase of my
primary training. My check pilots, the
more experienced flight instructors, taught me how to fly correctly. LTjg "Smoke" Stream, who made vice
admiral later in his career, gave me a down check because I didn't have a clue
on how to correct for crosswinds in landings.
He had just returned from a fleet squadron and showed me all the ways to
handle a plane in a crosswind. He told
me, "do anything you can do to prevent your plane drifting laterally to
the runway when you touch down, side slip, get a wing down in to the wind, skid,
etc." That instruction was to
become vital to me later in my career.
Forming the Hornet air group (HAG) can be compared to an expansion
baseball or football team. The Yorktown and Enterprise air groups
were already organized and experienced when the war started. They did not have as many inexperienced
pilots. A few senior pilots were
ordered into the Hornet air group, but the rest had just received their
wings.
The two dive bomber squadrons, VS-8 and VB-8 flew obsolete Curtis SBC-4 biplane
Helldivers until the Hornet arrived in San Diego in March 1942. They then received some very used SBDs.
It takes a lot of time to properly train an air group--carrier qualifying each
individual pilot in specific aircraft, etc.
Due to our accelerated deployment to the Pacific Fleet and the Doolittle
mission, most of the dive bomber pilots received only 8 to 10 hours
familiarization time in the SBDs at NAS North Island. We didn’t get to try field carrier landing practice in the SBDs
until the Hornet returned to Pearl Harbor after the Doolittle
mission. The wind was very gusty and
too dangerous to do simulated carrier landing and we had to stop the
operation. Also, no dive bombing
practice. The Doolittle mission robbed
the air group of our "spring training."
Within days after the Hornet arrived back at Pearl, we deployed to the
south Pacific. On that deployment the fighter pilots got to fly a few CAP
flights and the SBD pilots flew just some 200-mile single plane searches. To my knowledge, the torpedo pilots never
flew on that deployment. Only a few of
the older dive bomber pilots had any experience diving the SBD.
I asked our squadron C.O. why the dive bomber pilots returning from searches
couldn't climb up to 10,000 feet and at least make one practice dive on a
destroyer on the rear of the task force screen. I don't know if the idea was ever forwarded to CHAG (Commander of
the HAG, Stanhope Ring). I had never
made a 70 degree dive in the SBD until the BOM! Dive bombing takes practice and familiarity with the trim
characteristics of the SBD. Good rudder
trim, to avoid skidding, was probably the main essential for getting a
hit. Figuring out the correct lead was
always a tough problem. It took
practice on a moving target.
I met CHAG for the first time on the Hornet's
quarterdeck in September 1941 when I was checking in with my orders. He gave me a tour of the hanger and flight
deck. I was so green I didn't know you were supposed to ask the duty officer
for permission to come aboard and salute the flag! This was my first time on a carrier, and believe me, it looked
huge. I noticed an SBC-4, with “CHAG”
painted on the side, tied down on the hanger deck. At the time I didn't know this was the group commander's
aircraft. The biplane's landing gear
was damaged, its "flying wires" supporting the wings were broken, and
the wings were drooping. I never heard
an explanation, but I assumed that CHAG had wanted to make the first carrier
landing on the Hornet. It must
have been a lulu! You had to work at
making a bad landing in the SBC-4!
Looking back at those hectic times of accelerated
deployments, it was impossible to properly train our air group. I did read that the Japanese air groups
practiced coordinated attacks on their own carrier task forces until they
encountered bad weather while headed for Midway. I’ve never heard of our carrier task forces conducting that type
of training. The Japanese squadrons did
a better job of coordinating their attacks than we did. In 1942, they just had better trained
squadrons.
I wish I could remember the compass heading we were flying
the morning of June 4th. I do know I
plotted in our proposed course and computed the expected time to reach the
Japanese task force. When I found out I
was assigned to fly the left wing position on CHAG and that he intended to fly
above the two dive bomber squadrons to better coordinate the Hornet
aircraft, I was totally devastated! We
expected to get hit hard by Zeros and I knew they would immediate go after our
three plane formation in order to get the flight leader.
I even had a camera mounted in the belly of my plane. I was never checked out on the camera and didn't even know I was
the cameraman until I had started my engine.
The Hornet's chief photographer climbed up on my right wing to
show me where the camera switch was located.
It was behind my head and hard to reach without turning my shoulder
around about 90 degrees. I guess I was
supposed to try to get pictures of bomb damage. I assumed that CHAG and us two wingman would dive last. Looking back, CHAG should have briefed his
two wingmen in one of the ready rooms and worked out our navigational problem
together. From the reported location of
the Japanese carriers and our known Hornet position, there could only be
one course to fly. It was a very simple
navigational plot. I don't remember not
flying the course I had plotted in the ready room.
As we neared our point of no return, CHAG gave me a hand
signal to from a "scouting line" (a peacetime relic in my book),
pointing down at VS-8. I assumed he had
his other wingman pass the same order to VB-8.
Why would he want to break up our tactical formation and make us all setting
ducks if we encountered Zeros?
We had unlimited visibility while searching for the Japanese carriers. At the time I thought we needed to change
course to the north as I thought the huge vertical column of black smoke I
observed was coming from Midway. If the smoke was coming from a burning
Japanese carrier why didn't I see smoke from the other two carriers?
CDR McCluskey and the Enterprise SBDs were
approaching their point of no return and he had to make a decision on a change
of course. Fortunately, he spotted a
Japanese destroyer headed at high speed to the northeast. McCluskey then picked up the same course as
the destroyer. If he had not sighted
it, he probably would not have found the Japanese carriers. His flight was too low on fuel to do much
searching. My point is, was CDR
McCluskey's navigation any better than CHAG's?
I have a copy of CDR McCluskey's narrative of his flight and he never
mentions the course he was flying.
My conclusion: CHAG would have been a
better staff officer than operational flight leader. Most of us younger pilots that flew with CHAG on previous flights
considered him a below average pilot.
He was just too far removed from his squadron commanders and pilots in
converting from peacetime to wartime combat operations.
The C.O. of VT-8 may have guessed the Japanese position correctly, but he
doomed his entire squadron when he took it upon himself to take a different
course than the air group. The
sacrifice of all three torpedo squadrons did draw most of the Zeros down to
lower altitudes, permitting the Yorktown and Enterprise dive
bombers to make their dives almost unopposed.
I considered LCDR Gus Widhelm, the XO of VS-8, to be the best combat flight
leader in the Hornet air group.
I have often wondered what might have happened if he had been CHAG at
the BOM. Gus was combat fearless and a
superior naval aviator. On the morning
of June 6th, the third day of the BOM, Gus was the flight leader of the morning
attack on two cruisers and some destroyers.
Gus briefed the flight in the VS-8 ready room and told us he was going
to drive a bomb down the stack of the biggest cruiser. As we approached the targets, Gus broke
loose from our formation and did a solo dive on a cruiser and
"nailed" it just aft of the stack.
Now that was leadership! I know
every pilot in that flight wanted show Gus we could also get a direct hit. We tried, but our results were poor due to
our lack of experience diving the SBD.
Gus was an avid crap shooter and poker player who would bet on anything. He won a bet on a golf course that he could
hit a ball farther with his putter than his golfing buddies. He won!
Gus was once asked by some reporters if he ever got scared flying
combat. Gus told them that he bragged
so much he had to live up to his words!
He was killed in Texas about twenty years after the war, showing off by
attempting to do a low altitude slow roll.
The last time I talked to Gus I had crashed his farewell party at NAS Barbers
Point in June of 1951. I was XO of
VF-53 flying off the USS Essex.
The Essex air group was temporarily staged at Barbers Point
waiting for orders to deploy to Japan.
Somehow, I think with the help of Divine Intervention, I made it back to
my bunk that night!
Lest I forget--a great dive bomber pilot from VB-8, LT Fred Bates. Fred obtained a direct hit on the Shokaku
during the Battle of Santa Cruz. He
dropped his bomb at such a low attitude that
he got a small piece of the carrier’s flight deck in his cockpit. We always made our dives with an open
canopies.
The Hornet dive bombers never got a chance to attack the Japanese
carriers at the BOM, but I think our four or five 1000 pound direct hits on an
aircraft carrier at Santa Cruz while under attack by about 20 Zeros was a very
remarkable achievement. Also, fifteen
of the sixteen pilots and their gunners survived that flight to kiss some
California dirt.
I was always proud of the opportunity to fly off the Hornet
and to fly the tough old bird, the SBD.
Their bombs sank those four carriers at the BOM--four carriers that had
attacked Pearl Harbor.
Fighter pilots always seem to get the glory but the dive bomber pilots sunk the
ships!
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We are indebted
to Clay for this interesting and informative perspective, that he is uniquely
qualified to provide, on the early history of VB-8 and the HAG.
The next letter, from squadron-mate Roy Gee, continues on the same theme.
Here, Roy is commenting on "The Last Flight of C. Markland Kelly,
USNR" by Bowen Weisheit--the now well-known book that challenges the
official record of the HAG's flight on the morning of June 4th.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 8th, 1942, at 1546
we had picked up Ens. Talbet near the spot that we found the other three the
next day. It has been our deepest
regret that we couldn’t find ENSIGN Kelly and ENSIGN Hill who have been lost
near these other men.
I have the following comments:
Weisheit says in his Foreword, “Following take-off of the combat air
patrol, the attack group launched 34 dive bombers, 15 torpedo bombers, and 10
escorting fighters.” This statement could cause the a reader to believe that
the 10 fighter escorts were the last
group to take off. Of course, I knew better.
If the take-off had actually
been made in that order, some the 10 VF-8 fighters might not have run out of fuel.
No one knows if CHAG (CDR Ring) or anyone in the Hornet air
department even considered spotting the 10 F4F fighter aircraft on the hanger
deck and then moving them to the flight deck to be launched behind the
TBDs. In my opinion the fault for this fatal mistake in launch
sequence lies with the commanding officer of
VF-8. He should have recognized that a problem could occur with
the F4Fs being launched ahead of 59 bombers, and then burning lots of fuel
while orbiting overhead and patiently
waiting for the last aircraft to get airborne.
As a pilot in VB-8, I flew an SBD bomber on Ensign Kelly’s last flight,
and I can say without a doubt that we were going to have navigation problems on
the mission because of a conflict between CHAG and his squadron COs on the true
course to intercept the enemy. When
CHAG ordered that we would fly his navigation, we young ensigns in the bombing
squadrons knew we were in trouble. As
the strike group approached the point
of no return, ENS McInerny of VF-8
broke out of formation and approached
Mitchell's F4F, and signaled him to turn around and return due to fuel
shortage. Then McInerny reversed course and left the strike group, followed by
ENS Magda. LCDR Mitchell had failed to
maintain a dead reckoning course and had no idea where his 10 F4F escorting
aircraft were in relation to Task Force 16.
The final moments of Ensign Kelly’s
last flight had commenced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The "short
snorter" cited by Roy was the catalyst that started Bowen Weisheit on
his investigation of the HAG's track during the battle. The
latitude/longitude reported by the PBY crew as the pickup point for the
three VF-8 pilots was over 150 miles off from what was reported in
the Hornet's official after-action report. Also, the issue of
Waldron turning left when he broke away from Ring is crucial
to Weisheit's thesis, since the left turn would only have happened if the HAG
had flown west from the Hornet, rather than south as stated in the
official record. A southbound course--like the Enterprise air
group--would have required Waldron to break right in order to find the
Japanese fleet, but several HAG pilots and aircrew--including our own Dick
Woodson--saw VT-8 turn left. --RR
*
* *
"Why
I Joined the Roundtable"
Editor's
note: I thought everyone would enjoy reading new member Jeff Tome's
reasons for reporting aboard. And Jeff, by now you probably know that
your treasured "Incredible Victory," while a fine book, is only one
of several excellent references on the battle, and by no means is it the most
accurate. If you haven't already done so, check the other resources cited
on the "Midway Library" page on our web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
22 June 2004
From: Jeff Tome tome4@zoominternet.net
My
grandfather served on the USS Braxton, a fast attack transport in WWII. He told
me stories about some of the great naval battles of the war, one of which was
Midway. For my 8th birthday in 1975, he bought me a paperback copy of Incredible
Victory, which I still
have to this day, in all its weathered and torn glory. At one point, the
book was confiscated by my parents in hopes that I might read something, anything
else. That was the catalyst, and I have maintained an avid interest in
all issues related to Midway.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOW
HEAR THIS!
NEWS & INFO IN THIS
ISSUE
-- BOM 62nd Anniversary
Report
-- USS Yorktown
CV-5 Reunion Report
-- TV This Week
===========================================
BOM 62nd ANNIVERSARY REPORT
(see Now Hear This, issue 4-07 & 4-08)
U.S. Naval Academy,
Annapolis, 28 April: The annual BOM commemoration at the
academy was arranged and conducted by the class of 2004
Midshipmen. Eight BOM vets were in attendance: VADM Bill
Houser, CAPT Jack Crawford, CAPT Ken Simmons, Col. John Carey, LCDR Otis
Kight, LCDR Ken Crawford, LCDR John Urban, and Mr. William
Kowalczski. Roundtable founder Bill Price was also present, and RADM Mac
Showers was the guest speaker.
The wreath laying was
done jointly by Bill Houser, Academy Superintendent VADM Rodney P. Rempt,
and a senior class midshipman. At the banquet, there were
introductions, toasts, and each of the BOM veterans present was introduced and
asked to comment on their role in the battle. Awards were presented
to midshipmen who wrote BOM essays. The academy band performed and
provided music throughout the event. After dinner, RADM
Showers spoke on the signal intelligence contribution to the battle,
described Admiral Nimitz's planning based on that intelligence,
and summarized the results and significance of the battle.
In addition to the 900
midshipmen of the senior class, academy staff and faculty, veterans, and
other guests increased the audience to about 1,000. It was a
well-conducted affair, inspiring, and apparently enjoyed by all. (Thanks
to Mac Showers for this report.)
Jacksonville, FL, 4 June: The
Battle of Midway Night Dinner at the Radisson Hotel was well attended. It
was co-sponsored by the Navy League, several local businesses, and the
University of Jacksonville. The U.S. Navy Band performed. The guest
speaker was from the Naval Aviation Museum at Pensacola, and spoke on the
B.O.M. and its impact upon the rest of the war, including D-Day.
Twenty-four veterans of the battle were present, and each received an American
flag in a presentation case. Each flag had flown at Midway. (Thanks
to Bill Roy for this report.)
*
* *
USS YORKTOWN REUNION REPORT
(The following was
submitted by Roundtable member Paul Corio.) The Yorktown CV-5
Club reunion in June truly lived up to the great expectations I
imagined. The pinnacle event at the Charleston,
SC gathering was the tour of USS Yorktown CV-10
on June 4. For a number of the CV-5 veterans, it was the first time they
had been on a carrier since they leaped into the oily sludge
surrounding the old Yorktown 62 years ago. Once aboard
CV-10, most of them made a beeline for the CV-5 room located several decks
down. There, with bulkheads covered with period newspapers and photos of
sailors, ships and planes from CV-5's heyday, we all experienced a walk
back in time.
After a meal in the mess, CAPT Robert Zaluskus, commander of
Charleston Naval Weapons Station, addressed the veterans. He spoke with
eloquence about the tremendous debt this nation and the world owed them for
their service and sacrifice in defeating the Japanese at Midway. He
quoted the famous words of Walter Lord: "They had no right
to win, yet they did, and in doing so they changed the course of the
war." He spoke of how the victory was attained not by luck, but by
the incredible drive and determination and fighting spirit of the men who won
the day by those very characteristics, in conjunction with a unique ability to
seize the moment and take the appropriate action, no matter what the
odds. He cited Torpedo Squadron 8 skipper John Waldron as one
who epitomized that very attitude. But the most profound words spoken at
the luncheon were uttered to me in passing by CV-5 veteran Dutch Schanbacher as
we left the mess. "We didn't know we had no right to win," he
said emphatically. "We never considered anything but winning.
We were not losers!"
Indeed they were winners all. I had the great
privilege of walking the CV-10 flight deck and bridge with one of those
winners, W.E. Thrasher. W.E. had previously given me his vivid account of
the dive bomber attack on Yorktown on 4 June, which resulted in a bomb
hitting the deck some 25 feet from his 1.1 inch gun mount. With the CV-10
having a 1.1 mount on display, it was quite an experience to find myself
staring at the mount and the man who 62 years prior to the day had been part of
the 16 man Mount Four gun crew battling the Japanese.
I also walked the CV-10's decks with George Weise. On
4 June, George had arguably the worst battle station on the entire ship.
He was positioned high up on the island at a central location between two
searchlights, manning a .50 caliber machine gun. "Basically, they
were all aiming for me," he said of the dive bombers. A bomb
blast catapulted Weise into the air above his already lofty perch; he then
fell more than fifty feet to the deck below. He survived with
multiple broken bones and a severe concussion, only to be left in sick bay
along with 19 year old Norman Pichette when Yorktown was abandoned
after the torpedo attack. When they both regained consciousness and
recognized their predicament, the immobile Weise was able to persuade Pichette
to wrap his severe stomach wound with a sheet and try to make it topside.
"Shoot off a gun or something," Weise told him. Somehow
Pichette made it to the flight deck and was able to fire a machine gun,
alerting the lookout on a passing destroyer. Pichette was recovered from
Yorktown unconscious. He woke up in the destroyer's sickbay and lived
just long enough to tell of Weise's presence on Yorktown.
Another rescue crew was quickly dispatched; and so George Weise lives today,
due to his extraordinary resilience and the indomitable spirit of Norman
Pichette.
Seeing the Torpedo Squadron's Memorial for the first time
was a moving experience for me. The memorial, superbly designed by
Steve Ewing, features a large group photos of the pilots of all three torpedo
squadrons that attacked the Japanese carriers that day as well as rare
individual photos of nearly every one of the 68 pilots and radioman/gunners who
gave their lives in that heroic and sacrificial charge against what was then
the largest armada ever assembled.
The faces. There was Gregory Durawa of VT-6, who
didn't look a day over 15. He lost his life that day in the back seat of
Randolph Holder's TBD. There was the ever smiling face of Lem Massey, the
beloved VT-3 skipper, father of two young boys. He'd led the first ever
airborne torpedo attack in U. S. Navy history at Kwajalein as the XO of VT-6;
got the Distinguished Flying Cross for his actions. He knew what the
score would be when they attacked at Midway, knew he had little chance of ever
seeing his boys again when he lifted off Yorktown that June morning. But
still he led his squadron in at that crucial moment, charging headlong into the
overwhelming torrent of fighters and flak until he went down in flames.
He never wavered. None of them did...
There was the face of Massey's gunner, Leo
Perry. It's a face that haunts Lloyd Childers to this day, a face he
looked squarely into as smoke and flames engulfed Perry in the back seat of his
stricken TBD off Childers' port wing. But Perry kept fighting, firing at
pursuing Zeroes until his plane hit the water...
At the forefront of the Torpedo 8 section,
there was the familiar shot of John Waldron in front of
his Devastator; his last words to his squadron emboldened on a
plaque: "If there is only one plane left to make a final run-in, I
want that man to go in and get a hit. May God be with us
all."
And now they are all with God.
Paul sent
along a good photo of himself with two of the CV-5 vets (W. E. Thrasher and
Elton Brown) standing alongside a 1.1" quad gun. Click this URL to
see the photo: http://www.midway42.org/temp/cv10-2004.jpg
*
* *
TV THIS WEEK
TV listings of possible
interest for the week of 27
June - 4 July (8 days). Times shown are Pacific
Daylight Time--check your local guide for the time in your area.
Channels:
HC = History Channel
Friday, 2 July
8:00 PM (HC) "Aircraft
Carrier" The story of the Essex class CVs of WWII.
(Repeated at midnight.)
Saturday, 3 July
8:00 AM (HC) "Greatest
Raids: PT Boats in the Pacific"
Sunday, 4 July
8:30 AM (HC)
"Time Machine: Battles That Doomed Japan" (Do you suppose
they included the Battle of Midway in this one?)
6:00 PM (HC)
"Wake Island: Alamo of the Pacific" See the review in
issue 4-08. If you haven't caught this one yet, don't miss it this
time. It's a keeper.
8:00 PM (HC)
"Midway" The epic 1976 movie with Charlton Heston.
See the detailed review on the Midway Library page on our web site.
Whenever
you become aware of an upcoming TV listing that might be of interest to
our members, please send me the details not later than Saturday prior
to the broadcast date. The info needed is: date, time
(and time zone), channel, title, and any available descriptive info.
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